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Introduction
Inspiration for the Thesis
But the truth is, what our cities need isn’t just a partner. What you need is a partner who
knows that the old ways of looking at our cities just won’t do; who knows that our nation
and our cities are undergoing a historical transformation. The change that’s taking place
today is as great as any we’ve seen in more than a century, since the time when cities
grew upward and outward with immigrants escaping poverty, and tyranny, and misery
abroad.1
President Barack Obama’s remarks in his speech “A Metropolitan Strategy for America’s
Future” given in Miami on June 21, 2008 indicate his belief that urban areas in the U.S. are in a
transformation phase, and that new and innovative policy is necessary to combat issues facing
urban centers such as poverty, housing and economic development. However, where will the
substance of such policies stem from and the dynamic forces needed to execute such policies
emanate from? Will it be government agencies, social entrepreneurs in the non-profit arena, forprofit sector agents, or a combination of such forces that create, develop and implement Obama’s
vision for America’s cities? Additionally, how will the U.S. assemble human and monetary
capital to synthesize both past lessons learned from urban policies and the current demands?
This thesis will address the above questions by exploring social service delivery,
specifically in relation to affordable housing, and the role of government involvement and crosssector partnerships in the evolving low-income housing process. My interest in the role of crosssector partnerships and their effect on social service delivery has been paved by a longstanding
passion for addressing urban poverty, and my academic and extra-curricular experiences at Penn.
Through my research of the causes and consequences of urban poverty as an Urban Studies
minor, and my involvement in the Civic House, the community service hub at Penn, I have
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Barack Obama. “A Metropolitan Strategy for America’s Future,” Young Philly Politics, June 21, 2008,
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developed a passion for highlighting root causes of and finding solutions to the staggering and
problematic consequences of urban poverty. My internships at two real-estate development firms
further fostered my interest in affordable housing as a viable and important mechanism to bridge
the gaps between diverse communities, combat increasing socio-economic polarization and
facilitate cross-sector collaboration in dealing with the U.S.’s social and economic ills.
Additionally, my internship at the Netter Center for Community Partnerships at Penn brought my
attention to the challenges and promising opportunities of cross-sector partnerships, as the
organization is a product of and develops cross-sector collaboration in the West Philadelphia
community.
Research Question
The experiences discussed have been central in my decision to focus upon an important
and timely research question necessary for tackling issues essential to the future of affordable
housing. My question of inquiry is: What kinds of partnerships, if any, between non-profit
community development organizations, private sector actors, and local and national government
agencies (differentiated by the degree of local initiative and participation) are most effective in
generating successful affordable rental housing policy for the lowest-income populations in
urban areas with relatively large low-income populations?
My research and analysis led me to the conclusion that a cross-sector model of affordable
housing policy and implementation, in which there is collaboration between the public and
private sectors, is sound. This is due to the fact that each sector has unique core-competencies
that are indispensable to the low-income housing process, which includes advocacy,
policymaking, funding programs, development & construction, resident services and
performance measurement. However, currently the cross-sector model is decentralized in that
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affordable housing players and agencies operate in a policy field that is programmatic and
functional. As a result, the players in each sector act as individual agents carrying out specific
projects as opposed to a unified force working for common low-income housing goals. Due to
such a decentralized system, various important steps in the affordable housing process often get
overlooked and success, as defined by the maximal use of sector core-competencies and costeffective funding allocation, does not occur to its fullest potential.
The lack of a centralized or holistic approach in which all of the facets of the affordable
housing process would be spanned, prevents the varying levels of the public sector and the
private sector, comprised of for-profit and non-profit entities, from working together in the most
effective manner. To create a more well-rounded approach and to set a policy vision and goals
which can be achieved, the current decentralized system must adopt a centralized leadership base
rooted in the public sector. It is only through such public sector coordination and leadership,
driven by federal incentives to state local governments, that the core-competencies of all of the
players in each sector can be fully leveraged and synthesized to achieve innovation and success
in the delivery of the diverse components of the affordable housing process.
Why Affordable Housing?
In 2006, 17.7 million households were paying more than half their incomes for housing, with the
numbers and shares in nearly all age groups and family types—and at all levels of work—on the
increase. Meanwhile, the homeless population is up to 744,000 on any given night, and is
estimated to be between 2.3 million and 3.5 million over the course of a year.2
Affordable housing is the focus of this paper because it is among one of the most
challenging and important social and economic issues, as it is inextricably linked to national
economic and social policies.3 The magnitude and scope of the need for affordable housing is
illustrated by the fact that among the lowest-income households, 9.1 million renters with
2
3

“The State of the Nation’s Housing 2008,” Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2008, http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/.
Tracy M. Soska “Housing,” in Encyclopedia of Social Work (e-reference edition) (2008).
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incomes below 30 percent of the median local income receive no housing assistance.4 Lowincome housing policy is a cause and result of overarching societal problems such as poverty,
economic inequality and racial disparities.5 Affordable housing is also studied because there is
ample public, private and non-profit sector interaction. Institutions within each sector contribute
to the affordable housing development and implementation process due to the multi-faceted
nature of building, financing and managing housing and the various skill sets required.
Additionally, increasing class polarization is both represented by and a product of the housing
stock in urban centers, which indicates that affordable housing can shed light on a multitude of
other social concerns that contribute to urban poverty. Furthermore, the recent credit crisis
followed by a recession of unknown magnitude highlights the severity of the issues to be
discussed in the thesis.
According to Gloria Guard, the director of the People’s Emergency Center, the oldest
social service agency for women in Philadelphia, “the banking industry and the housing industry
are inexorably tied to each other, so the housing industry is now facing a pretty enormous crisis
of confidence, and any research on how to get these housing units built for the future would be
very helpful.”6 This thesis is committed to conducting such research, and will hopefully aid
citizens, politicians and non-profit and private sector leaders in designing the future of affordable
housing policy in the United States. While the hypotheses of this paper operate under the
assumption that the credit markets, a key driver for most federal affordable housing programs,
will reemerge to some extent after the passing of the current financial crisis, the effects of the

4

John M. Quigley, “Just Suppose: Housing Subsidies for Low-Income Renters,” Joint Center for Housing Studies of
Harvard University (2007): 14.
5
Soska.
6
Gloria Guard 12/2/2008.
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crisis will be briefly discussed in the conclusion in terms of how affordable housing policy and
implementation must react and respond to the deteriorating economic environment.
According to an article entitled, “The New Politics of Affordable Housing” by Robert E.
Lang, Katrin E. Anacker and Steven Hornburg, “the politics of affordable housing are a bit
perplexing. Because housing is often the largest expense most families face, concern over its cost
should register in national politics, yet it does not (although we are not sure whether the current
crisis in subprime lending and foreclosure has helped elevate the issue).”7 Lang, Anacker and
Hornburg suggest that affordable housing is a concern that pervades the lives of many Americans
and the U.S. economy, and is in essence, a work in progress. This quote concludes that lowincome housing is a policy area that is on the rise in terms of its place on the national agenda.
President-Elect Barack Obama has mentioned in various speeches that affordable housing
is a key policy area in his administration. His recent appointment of Shaun Donovan, the current
commissioner of the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development, to
head the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), further represents Obama’s
commitment to the issues of affordable housing and urban development. According to Obama,
“the final part of my plan to change the odds in our cities will be to ensure that more Americans
have access to safe, affordable housing. As President, I’ll create an Affordable Housing Trust
Fund that would add as many as 112,000 new affordable units in mixed income
neighborhoods.”8 Since affordable housing is an increasingly salient issue to politicians and
citizens, it is important to understand the political environment and carefully frame the terms of
the affordable housing policy arena and debate. 9
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Robert E. Lang, et al., “The New Politics of Affordable Housing,” Housing Policy Debate 18, no.2 (2008): 231.
Barack Obama, “Changing the Odds for Urban America,” April 18, 2008,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=77007.
9
Lang, et al., 244.
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Paper Structure
The structure of the thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter identifies the
strengths and weaknesses of the public and private sectors with the conclusion reached that no
sector can effectively lead the affordable housing process alone, and that each sector has
important skills and core competencies to be maximized. The chapter is organized around three
parts: the public sector and the private sector, with separate parts for non-profit and the for-profit
entities. Within each of these three sections, sector strengths and weaknesses are highlighted, a
brief history of each sector is presented, and counterfactuals are discussed.
The second chapter, by using Philadelphia as an example, describes the complex process
of the current affordable housing system to paint a picture of the different players and funding
streams that guide the process. This chapter, by providing the reader with a basic background of
the current decentralized cross-sector partnership model, also demonstrates the drawbacks of its
fragmented nature, as well as introduces the centralized partnership model as an alternative
strategy. While the centralized model is also a cross-sector partnership model, it differs from the
decentralized partnership model that currently exists by shifting to an approach where the public
sector (federal, state and local) serves to influence and change the affordable housing sysem
through its leadership, vision and unification.
Based on the evidence in chapters one and two, the concept of a centralized partnership
model, with the public sector as its central driver, is emphasized. The prior segments of this
paper collectively suggest that the public and private (for-profit and non-profit) sectors must be
involved in the affordable housing procedure and that a leadership gap exists which has seriously
curtailed its successful advancement. The chapter identifies who the four dominant groups of
players in the centralized partnership model are, what their roles and responsibilities should be,
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and what their relationships with the public sector, the central force of the model, should look
like. Lastly, the positive implications of a centralized model are illuminated through a proposed
vision based on three pertinent policy areas that have both national significance and local
applicability. The three components of the vision are: integrated and mixed-income housing,
strategic community development and smart and regional growth. The reasons for selecting the
agenda items, as well as the strategies and incentives necessary to carry out such goals, and
sector roles within these big-picture concepts are discussed.

Research Methodology
The research conducted for this honors thesis can be broken into three categories:
secondary scholarly research, current program websites and articles, and primary research. The
first category of secondary research was conducted so as to frame past, present and future
pertinent affordable housing issues, provide a detailed historical context for the paper and present
and weigh diverse theories and strategies. The three main sources that have set the foundation for
this historical research are: The “Housing” section of the Encyclopedia of Social Work, multiple
articles from different volumes of the journal Housing Policy Debate, and past State of the
Nation’s Housing reports posted on Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies website.
To explore the current state of the affordable housing market, policy process, players and
results, a host of sources were reviewed including articles from Policylink.org, the Fannie Mae
KnowledgePlex website, the Housing Policy Debate journal, the “2008 State of the Nation’s
Housing” from Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies website, and urban policy speeches
given by Barack Obama and other politicians. The second type of research was a comprehensive
investigation of the websites, programs and structures of the key government agencies and
private sector organizations involved in affordable housing. By exploring these websites, the
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current communication and implementation processes, leadership structures and corecompetencies of the public and private sectors were illuminated.
The third category is primary research. I conducted eight interviews with individuals
involved in the affordable housing process across all levels of government, and in many different
functions in the private sector. These interviewees offered diverse viewpoints that spanned forprofit interests, non-profit concerns and goals, and public sector policy and leadership. The
interviewees include: Michael Stegman, the Director of Policy at the MacArthur Foundation’s
Program on Human and Community Development, who has been a consultant to the Fannie Mae
Foundation and an important policymarker at HUD; John Kromer, who is a senior consultant at
the Fels Institute of Government and who previously served as the Director of Philadelphia’s
Office of Housing & Community Development; and Monica Sussman, a lawyer who specializes
in all types of real estate transactions and housing and community development law and who was
previously Deputy General Counsel of HUD.

Chapter One: No Player Can Play and Win Alone
Introduction
Do cross-sector partnerships enhance the affordable housing process, or do they act as a
barrier to direct action? Is the current decentralized cross-sector model necessary to maximize
the success of affordable housing in terms of production and positive societal outcomes, or can
one sector more efficiently carry out such an agenda? Cross-sector partnerships, or collaboration
between the public and private sectors, are a necessary backbone for the implementation of lowincome housing strategies because each sector has unique core-competencies that no single
sector can possess. Therefore, this policy field cannot be comprehensive and ultimately
successful without the diverse voices brought to the table from government agencies at the
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federal, state and local levels, and for-profit and non-profit entities, which make up the private
sector. Within the three sections of this chapter, sector strengths and weaknesses are highlighted,
and counterfactuals are discussed in order to shed light on the negative consequences that would
result if any player was either the sole leader or absent from the affordable housing process.
A. The Public Sector: Revolutionary Goals & Concentrated Poverty
Public Sector Historical Overview
Government involvement in the evolution of affordable housing policy for low-income
populations can be segregated into two timeframes: the first running from The Housing Act of
1949 to Nixon’s moratorium on subsidized production programs in 1973, and the second running
from 1973 to today.10 While the first period was marked by federal control of the entire
affordable housing production process through high-rise public housing initiatives, the second
period has been defined by the disintegration of a federal leadership role, and increased state and
local government responsibilities. The shift to the devolution of leadership and responsibilities to
state and local levels was due to recognition by the federal government and low-income housing
policy advocates that public housing exacerbated the negative social situations of the lowestincome populations by isolating them in public housing facilities in very poor areas.
Additionally, complete control by the federal government resulted in clashes with local
governments, and poor location and design choices resulted from the government’s lack of
knowledge regarding local demographics and specific housing issues.11 The affordable housing
industry therefore went from full federal control to a decentralized cross-sector partnership
industry in which multiple players occupy space in the policy and implementation arenas.

10

Charles J. Orlebeke, “The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Policy, 1949-1999,” Housing Policy Debate 11, no.
2 (2000): 489.
11
Orlebeke, 497.
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The Federal Government
Strengths
The federal government, unlike any other sector or entity, is the engine that enables
affordable housing to exist and function. The strengths of the federal government are: making
affordable housing a national priority and driving and sustaining the evolution of the industry,
and creating funding structures and allocation programs for such funds. The Housing Act of
1949 created a permanent place for affordable housing on the federal policy agenda through its
declaration that “the U.S.’s health and living standards required the realization as soon as
feasible of the goal of a decent home and suitable living environment for every American
family.”12 The Act was founded on the belief that the federal government would solve the
nation’s housing problems through committed political leadership at the top and “the
implementation muscle of a technically skilled, socially conscious bureaucracy working its will
with an eager housing industry and compliant local governments.”13 As a result of the Act,
approximately 588,000 units of public housing were started in the 1950s, slum clearance and
redevelopment plans were utilized and highrise public housing facilities were built in many
urban areas.14
The creation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in 1965 and
the Housing Act of 1968 confirmed the federal government’s commitment to affordable housing
production and represents its long-term goal of continually improving the industry. The Housing
Act of 1968, in which the notion of federal leadership and efficiency in housing policies
triumphed, reaffirmed the Act of 1949 with new well-funded housing subsidy programs, specific

12
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Orlebeke, 290.
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Housing Policy Debate 11, no.2 (2000): 312
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production targets and timeframes, planning requirements aimed at dispersing low-income
housing, and a new fair housing act outlawing racial discrimination.15
Although the 1973 moratorium instigated the devolution of affordable housing
implementation and leadership to state and local levels and the private sector, the new slew of
programs the federal government created represent its continuous focus on maintaining
affordable housing as an important policy area. Additionally, the fact that the federal government
rebounded from past ineffective affordable public housing ventures by experimenting with new
programs suggests that it understood the need for changing its strategies so as to maximize the
success of low-income housing. Examples of such experimentation include the creation of the
Housing Voucher Program, initiated in the Community Development Act of 1974. The Voucher
program “cut the tie between a subsidized renter and a physical project built solely for lowincome occupancy and in doing so, opened up new opportunities for geographic mobility and
economic—perhaps even racial—integration.”16 The Community Development Block Grant
Program (CDBG) and The HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME) have increased
local flexibility in carrying out housing goals by enabling local governments to target their
neediest populations and address place-specific housing issues. The Voucher Program, CDBG
and HOME have produced hundreds of thousands of units since their inception.
While the affordable housing industry has fundamentally changed between 1949 and
2009, the federal government’s key strengths throughout this entire period have been instigating
and driving all policies and programs and continuously improving the system. The federal
government’s long history of prioritizing affordable housing as a major national issue and

15
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providing increasing amounts of funding to finance low-income housing programs make it the
solid leader of the field.
Weaknesses
While the federal government has spearheaded the affordable housing industry and
driven its evolution throughout the years, the history of its involvement has been very mixed.
The government’s visionary goals have been negatively affected by its lack of practical
oversight, oversimplification of social and economic issues that exist alongside housing, and
political pressures. The Housing Acts of 1949 and 1968 lacked practical goals and oversight. In
the years following the Act of 1949, public housing fell short of official production targets, new
programs failed to gain momentum and executive responsibility for housing was disorganized.17
While the 1968 Act was created due to the failure of the 1949 Act in reaching its aspirations, and
intended to initiate quantified production targets and a disciplined timetable, the implausibility of
eradicating low-income housing issues in the set timeframe of 10 years was not focused on by
the government, and was not realized until the implementation phases.18
Negative political and public pressures led the federal government to build affordable
housing and support policies that ultimately produced harmful consequences for low-income
populations. In the pre-1973 public housing era, whites as well as African Americans often
rejected the idea of predominately black public housing, which illuminated local class and racial
conflicts. In response to these controversies, housing projects were built near old sites, thus
concentrating poverty in lower-class areas of cities, which reinforced rather then eradicated
racial ghettos.19 In the post-1973 affordable housing period the major weakness of the federal
government is that it hasn’t held local players accountable for their actions. For example, the
17
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Hope VI program, started under the Clinton administration to rehabilitate distressed
neighborhoods and public housing units, and often implemented by private sector developers,
has failed to provide a one-on-one replacement of units due to a private sector desire to save
money. In light of the current low supply of affordable housing, the federal government’s lack of
oversight and inability to hold these developers accountable is a major weakness.20 Additionally,
the federal government does not currently require property owners of affordable housing units
funded through programs including CDBG and HOME to regularly submit data on the incomes
and rent burdens of residents. The federal government cannot continue to improve its affordable
housing programs and ensure that its goals are being carried out unless such data is collected and
reported. The weaknesses of the federal government are thus based on its lack practical
reasoning, political pressures and inability to effectively use its public and private sector
counterparts in advancing affordable housing policy.
Counterfactuals
In the pre-1973 period when the federal government was the sole leader and implementer
of affordable housing, weaknesses such as a deficiency of knowledge regarding local
environments, political pressures and oversimplification of diverse housing needs and their
connection to other social issues often resulted in increased racial tensions, economic segregation
and social ills such as drug use. Affordable housing needs vary in different regions across the
country. The federal government cannot tackle these issues without local government and private
sector involvement. Therefore, while the federal government is the engine of affordable housing
policy, the system is weakened without the participation of other diverse players in the policy
field. On the other hand, if the federal government was absent from the policy arena there would

20
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be no low-income housing due to the fact that it is an industry created and sustained, both in
terms of funding programs and leadership, by the federal government.
State & Local Governments
Strengths
State and local governments possess two main strengths within the affordable housing
system. First, they are in the best position to define their region’s low-income housing needs
based on a detailed knowledge of multiple factors including local demographics, economic
conditions and racial segregation in inner-cities. Their other main strength is their ability to
leverage private sector expertise by forming partnerships with for-profit and non-profit entities to
implement federal and some state and local funding. Local housing agencies can tailor plans to
better fit the needs of residents, integrate housing initiatives with broader community
development goals, and avoid inefficient top-down bureaucratic methods through partnerships
with the private sector.21 State and local governments also have the unique capacity to introduce
land-use ordinances that foster affordable housing production through initiatives such as
inclusionary zoning, rent controls, and subdivision and parking requirements. For example, the
Moderately Priced Development Unit (MPDU) program in Montgomery County, MD, which has
required private developers to build a certain amount of affordable units in exchange for
increased building density, has led to the production of hundreds of thousands of affordable
housing units within a relatively small geographic area.
Weaknesses
The major weaknesses of state and local governments are that they often fall prey to
political pressures in the federal funding allocation process, and that they too often succumb to
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Janet L. Smith, “The Space of Local Control in the Devolution of US Housing Policy,” Human
Geography 82 (2000): 222.

16

constituent groups that strongly oppose pro-low-income housing policies such as inclusionary
zoning and permit requirements that create incentives for the construction of such housing.
According to Andy Altman, the Deputy Mayor for Community and Economic Development in
Philadelphia, “the local request for proposals (RFP) process to non-profit community
development corporations and for-profit developers is laden with politics, and that as a result, the
process is not as competitive as it should be.”22
Counterfactuals
It would be impossible for state and local governments to be the sole leaders of the
affordable housing policy realm simply due to a lack of monetary and human resources.
However, state and local governments play a crucial role as a medium between federal dollars
and private sector implementation. The local public sector takes the federal government engine
and gives it a direction. On a day to day basis, local political leaders are the face of affordable
housing to residents, and can directly alter housing opportunities for low-income populations.
State and local governments have the unique ability to unify the public and harness their support
for low-income housing policies as well as voice concerns of their diverse constituent groups to
the federal government to help inform future policies. Also, without state and local governments,
important and varied place-based interests would not be addressed.
B. The Private Sector: Non-Profit Community Voice and Lack of Skill and Power23
Non-Profit Historical Overview
The contemporary non-profit housing sector is comprised of both Community
Development Corporations (CDCs) and larger national and regional non-profit intermediary
organizations. While other non-profit players such as housing counseling agencies and

22
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supportive service providers exist, this paper only explores CDCs and non-profit intermediaries
in-depth because they are the dominant non-profit actors in affordable housing, and are the only
players present in all stages of the process. While CDCs often emerge as a result of community
groups protesting bad neighborhood conditions, the larger non-profit intermediaries were created
through cooperative arrangements on the part of local civic leaders, bankers, and public and nonprofit organizations.24 CDCs are small, local organizations that provide affordable housing and
jobs for neighborhood populations. They are often formed by residents, small business owners,
religious congregations, or other local stakeholders that have an interest in revitalizing low or
moderate income communities. The larger national and regional non-profits operate on a
citywide or regional basis, and have a public/private business model that forges partnerships
among the business community and government sectors to create and sustain affordable
housing.25
Non-profits entered the affordable housing scene in the 1960s.26 The 1966 Special Impact
Amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act and Title VII of the Community Services Act of
1974 produced the first wave of Community Development Corporations (CDCs).27 Between
1966 and 1981, more than $500 million in federal funds was allocated to 63 CDCs through such
programs.28 During the 1990s, CDCs took on a broader range of initiatives that included
economic development, youth and workforce development, community organizing and
community facilities development.29 The number of CDCs that carried out affordable housing
and economic revitalization initiatives drastically increased during the 1990s. From 1991 to
24

Rachel G. Bratt, “Should We Foster the Nonprofit Housing Sector as Developers and Owners of Subsidized
Rental Housing?” Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University (2008): 6.
25
Bratt, 6.
26
Bratt, 3.
27
Bratt, 3.
28
Bratt, 4.
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Christopher Walker et al., “National Support for Local System Change: The Effect of the National Community
Development Initiative on Community Development Systems,” The Urban Institute (2002): 15
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2001, the number of CDCs that were able to produce over 10 units of housing annually almost
doubled.30 Currently, CDCs have produced or rehabilitated more than 1.25 million units of
housing, and in general, they have been responsible for a significant percentage of the lowerincome housing that has been developed over the last two decades.31 CDCs have played a major
role in providing housing opportunities to 1.5 million households, which is about one third of the
overall low-income housing sector.32
Strengths
The non-profit sector, being largely driven by a social mission, has been crucial in:
bringing the low-income voice to the table on affordable housing issues; providing social
services to complement housing; producing affordable housing units; and encouraging resident
self-sufficiency. CDCs are also willing to enter low-income neighborhoods that for-profit
developers will not serve. One of the largest studies of CDCs, undertaken by Vidal in the late
1980s reported that:
Cencus tracts in the neighborhoods served by sampled CDCs shows a substantially lower
median income than do other census tracts in the same cities…these neighborhoods
include a considerably greater proportion of families with children that have incomes
below the poverty line and of families on public assistance…If census tracts in each city
are ranked according to their median incomes, those served by the sampled CDCs are
clearly clustered in more distressed parts of their cities.33
The non-profit ability to take risks that other developers are unwilling to take, and to invest in
very low-income neighborhoods, often stimulates other public and private investment. CDCs are
also more effective at delivering services than public and for-profit sector organizations, as their
mission is more aligned with local community interests. Such integration makes them better at
understanding and addressing community problems.
30
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CDCs facilitate local decision-making processes amongst community members who can
then work towards establishing a neighborhood development agenda.34 Researches at the Urban
Institute found evidence of strong community alliances and leadership inside neighborhoods with
CDCs.35 While housing is the primary focus of CDCs, many also strive to promote resident selfsufficiency. CDCs have thus emerged as leaders in providing what is known as “housing plus”
services, or a particular mix of initiatives that depend on a CDCs mission, community needs,
staff capacity and the availability of funds.36 Since CDCs have strong ties to their communities,
they are better able to manage local community concerns and politics, and they often have
connections to city councils and other influential local organizations.37 The strengths of CDC
involvement in affordable housing thus lie in resident services, community support, political
advocacy and serving as a community liaison.38 Non-profit intermediaries have additional
distinct core-competencies. Such intermediary groups provide organizational, leadership and
technical assistance to CDCs, fund numerous housing projects, and establish performance
metrics by monitoring CDC progress. Another strength of the intermediaries is that they are able
to mobilize monetary and policy support from local and national stakeholders. Both CDCs and
non-profit intermediaries play a critical role in bringing the voice of the low-income population
to bear, developing units in low-income neighborhoods and highlighting necessary supportive
services that need to co-exist alongside affordable housing production in order the maximize the
effectiveness of resident success.
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Weaknesses
The main weakness of the non-profits involved in the affordable housing process is their
lack of development knowledge and expertise. In addition, another systemic shortfall of nonprofits is that their long-term viability is often at risk due to a deficiency of financial resources
and human capital. A study by Bratt et al. revealed significant concerns with the long-term
viability of non-profit CDCs. The properties produced by CDCs examined in the study showed a
problematic pattern in capital and operating reserve balances.39 More than one half of the total
number of non-profit CDC developers in their sample said they were spending more than they
were taking in, and the deficits ranged from 10 to 30 percent of annual operating expenditures.40
The CDCs deal with these financial issues by allowing their accounts payable to rise to
dangerous levels, or they use nonrecurring sources of income to balance the budget.41
Additionally, another weak point is that due to CDCs grassroots orientation, non-profit
housing development in poor neighborhoods often serves to trap such individuals in dangerous
communities with limited economic opportunities. Research has shown that it may be impossible
to develop a significant amount of jobs in these areas without linking community development to
the centers of economic growth within regions.42 Some CDCs that recognize this fact attempt to
bring jobs into these low-income areas, but most CDCs still spend the majority of their money
solely on housing.43 While the non-profit sector plays an important role in the affordable housing
process, its financial stability and human and intellectual capital is often lacking.
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Counterfactuals
While non-profits act both as a citizen voice and as a housing developer, they exist within
a federal framework of policies and housing goals. Non-profits only became involved in
affordable housing due to federal policies. If non-profits were to be put entirely in charge of the
low-income housing process, it would lack the resources and skills to drive an innovative system.
Since non-profits serve mainly low-income populations, they would be out of touch with middle
and upper class concerns, and would not be able to effectively promote and implement equitable
communities. Also, if non-profits sector were the key driver of affordable housing production,
the for-profit sector would likely be alienated due to the non-profit sectors lack of capacity to
define and implement incentives attractive to for-profit developers. However, non-profits must
be present in the affordable housing process because they act as an important check to the public
sector and for-profit organizations, as its core strength is its social conscience and direct
connection to the citizens being served by affordable housing initiatives.
C. The Private Sector: For-Profit Expertise & the Bottom Line
For-Profit Historical Overview
For-profit developers became involved in the production of affordable housing when the
National Housing Act was created in 1937. The National Housing Act provided incentives for
private developers to address affordable housing needs with the support of multiple rent
subsidies and mortgage insurance programs.44 The 1960s saw increased for-profit involvement in
the affordable housing process. Starting in the 1960s the federal government stimulated the
production of affordable housing by the for-profit sector.45 A combination of incentives
including below-market financing, federal income tax incentives and annual operating subsidies
44
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made it profitable for private developers to build affordable housing. Initiated in 1965, the
Housing Choice Voucher program enabled low-income households to buy privately owned rental
units with federal subsidies. Such demand-side production programs, during the 1960s and 1970s
produced over 900,000 affordable housing units.46 Housing researchers estimate that 75 to 80
percent of all affordable housing is currently developed by for-profit developers, thus indicating
the dominance of the private sector in the affordable housing industry.47
Strengths
The core strengths of for-profit developers are their technical expertise, staff capacity,
development oversight and practical business sense. This contrasts with the non-profit sector,
which places greater emphasis on a social mission. According Ron Kaplan, who is involved in
the private sector real-estate industry and was previously CFO of Federal Reality Investment
Trust, “the private sector has to be in the affordable housing arena to point out the practical
economic picture of affordable housing.”48 Kaplan also noted that, “the private sector brings up
important practical policy questions that often temper idealistic public sector goals.”49 For-profit
developers are attractive owners and developers of affordable housing because they bring
financial and technical resources to projects, and can often cover land and acquisition costs as
well as up-front development costs.50 For-profit developers also are often responsible for
financial packaging, equity and guarantees and construction management in affordable housing
deals.51
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Weaknesses
The for-profit focus on the bottom line often conflicts with the long-term affordability
needs of low-income residents and the social purpose implicit in affordable housing. A host of
problems regarding for-profit involvement in low-income housing have resulted from this
tension. Due to such tension, for-profit developers using Low-Income Housing Tax Credits are
less likely than non-profit organizations and the public sector to develop housing in areas with
the highest percentages of low-income households.52 Since such populations require additional
services that are challenging to identify and arrange and are unprofitable, for-profit developers
often avoid such communities.
The expiring use issue has proven to be another disadvantage of for-profit involvement.
More specifically, this issue arose in the 1980s when privately owned subsidized developments
reached a point where owners were no longer bound to regulatory agreements that they had
signed with HUD to rent their units to low-income populations. It has been costly for the public
sector to design incentives to keep for-profit developers from exiting subsidy programs for lowincome housing in places where market conditions favor conversion to market-rate rentals or
condominiums.53 This problem was slightly mitigated by Acts of Congress in 1987 and 1990 that
provided emergency and permanent responses to the issue of expiring use.54 The Acts, by
guaranteeing owners fair market value incentives to keep housing affordable for 50 years,
enabled owners to either continue owning the housing or sell to non-profit groups that made the
same long-term affordability commitments.55 However, most private developers utilized the
incentives for themselves and equity takeouts with little or no funds reinvested in the property
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occurred.56 While private sector developers have brought significant investment capital to the
affordable housing table, this required costly tax incentives to accommodate and encourage
developers. Furthermore, each of these incentives led to the creation of costly new programs to
secure the long-term affordability of properties.57
Counterfactuals
While the for-profit technical expertise and profit-based mentality are critical to the
effective production of affordable housing and budgetary success, for-profit entities would not be
able to lead the process without the public sector and non-profit groups. As with non-profits, forprofits became involved in the affordable housing arena due to public sector incentives. Without
being enticed by the public sector through tax credits and other financial benefits, for-profit
developers would not be able to profitably produce affordable housing and thus would not
participate in the process. For-profits also do not share the same values and organizational
strategies as non-profits, and would not be able to facilitate cross-sector partnerships that are
vital to successful affordable housing production. Therefore, while for-profit companies are
necessary to the process, their core-competencies alone cannot lead an effective process, and
would rather result in the potential eradication of affordable housing.
Conclusion
The multiple players within the public and private sectors are crucial to the affordable
housing process due to their differing voices and core-competencies. It is only through the
synthesis of such distinct strengths that affordable housing policy and implementation can be
comprehensive and successful in terms of the amount of units produced, populations reached,
and additional social services offered. Therefore, a cross-sector partnership model, although
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complex and multi-faceted, is necessary due to the wide-reaching prongs of affordable housing,
from policymaking, to building, to resident services.

Chapter Two: Current Affordable Housing System—A Decentralized Process
Introduction
“It takes a village to produce affordable housing.”58
This was the first statement made by Monica Sussman at our interview on affordable
housing. These words provide a concise snapshot of the complicated and decentralized lowincome housing process that spans across the public and private sectors. Two broad groups of
players dominate this complex affordable housing field: the public sector, made up of the federal
government and state and local governments, and the private sector, comprised of for-profit and
non-profit organizations. Within each of these sectors, there are multiple entities that play crucial
roles in the affordable housing process. This chapter explores the decentralized, fragmented and
complicated process by conducting an in-depth exploration of the key programs and players that
dominate the current policy arena. One cannot understand why a centralized cross-sector model
led by the public sector is necessary until the complexity of the process is identified and
dissected. This section is broken up into two parts. First, public and private sector players and
programs are identified and described by using Philadelphia as a model to provide a contextual
base for the reader. Second, through an analysis of the overall processes and movement of funds,
the core facets of decentralization are touched on and the weaknesses of such a system are
discussed.
Philadelphia, its players, programs and processes are explored in order to paint a realistic
picture of the current decentralized and fragmented affordable housing process. Philadelphia is
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the example studied here due to the fact that it is a transition city and is representative of many
other urban areas in terms of funding and the involved public and private players. Philadelphia is
analyzed because: the city is at the end of the complex chain of policies and funding; all of the
actors that are critical to the process exist in Philadelphia; and the city allows for the exploration
of the entire trickle down process from the federal to the local levels. Philadelphia represents the
status quo in terms of the decentralized system of low-income housing due to its programmatic,
as opposed to holistic and goal-oriented base. While some localities pose exceptions to this
decentralized model, such places are not the norm, and differ from the typical affordable housing
delivery system due to the preferences of their political leaders. These exceptions often are not
permanent, as the housing policies change when such visionary leaders are no longer on the
scene.
Philadelphia’s enormous vacancy and homelessness rates, as well as its decreasing urban
population, like those of other urban areas, have made it imperative for the city to alter its
affordable housing policy as it goes through the transition from a manufacturing to a global
economy. David W. Bartelt in his article entitled Urban Housing in an Era of Global Capital,
mentions that Philadelphia is a good example to use to study housing policy reform in light of
the new global context, because issues of affordability, abandonment and homelessness which
are present in many urban cities have plagued it since its transition from a manufacturing to a
service center.59 The city also has a balanced public and private sector presence, making it a
good example for other urban areas to use to assess the affordable housing policy process and the
required players. Philadelphia therefore has the characteristics that make it a microcosm of other
urban affordable housing landscapes.
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The Public Sector (Federal, State & Local Levels)
The production and retention of affordable housing is both a top down and bottom up
process. The majority of affordable housing financing for Philadelphia comes from the federal
government and through tax-credits available from the Department of Treasury’s Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). Nonetheless, such federal funds trickle down to state and local levels,
where their use and implementation are determined through a considerable amount of local
autonomy. Additionally, the state and local levels have their own agencies that can drive, to a
lesser extent, the affordable housing process through initiatives such as permitting, inclusionary
zoning and contracting out projects through requests for proposals (RFPs). Thus affordable
housing is tangibly shaped by local governments and their private sector partners.
A. The Federal Government
There are six main federal programs that finance and help shape low-income housing in
urban areas including Philadelphia:
(1) Public Housing
Public housing is a federally run supply and demand-side production program that
involves HUD and local housing authorities. Currently, there are 1.2 million households living in
public housing units, managed by 3,300 Housing Authorities, including the Philadelphia Housing
Authority.60 Housing Choice Vouchers, the main public housing program since its creation in
1974, allows low-income families to purchase or lease privately owned rental housing.61 While
local public housing authorities have a fair amount of autonomy in utilizing public housing
funds, The Section 8 Management Assessment Program (SEMAP) measures the performance of
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the public housing agencies that administer the voucher program.62 Public housing funding and
implementation varies based on the demographics of localities.
(2) Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program
CDBG, which was started in 1974, provides communities with resources to address
multiple community development needs.63 According to the HUD website, “the CDBG program
provides annual grants on a formula basis to 1180 general units of local government and
States.”64 Since Philadelphia and other urban cities are what’s known as entitlement
communities, they receive grants directly from the federal government.65 To receive a CDBG
grant, entitlement communities must submit to HUD a Consolidated Plan that details their
economic development and housing goals. The Section 108 Loan Guarantee Program, a part of
CDBG, provides communities with financing for economic development, housing rehabilitation,
public facilities and large housing development projects.66 According to Andy Altman, the
Director of Commerce and the Deputy Mayor for Planning & Economic Development in
Philadelphia under Mayor Michael Nutter, “the CDBG program is given based on a formula and
has some specific programmatic set asides, and is one of the main flows of federal funding for
affordable housing in Philadelphia.”67 CDBG funds enable Philadelphia to produce about 460
new units of affordable rental housing and rehabilitate around 11,750 units annually.68 CDBG
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funds are also used to provide social services and job training to about 965,000 individuals
annually.69
(3) HOME Investment Partnerships program
HOME, started in 1974, is the largest federal block grant given to states and localities to
develop affordable housing for low-income households and about $2 billion are distributed
annually. According to the HUD website, “the HOME program provides formula grants to States
and localities that communities use often in partnership with local nonprofit groups to fund a
wide range of activities that build, buy, and/or rehabilitate affordable housing for rent or
homeownership or provide direct rental assistance to low-income people.”70 Similar to the
CDBG, HOME requires the submission of a Consolidated Plan to receive funds. Philadelphia
produces around 1,135 new rental units and provides rental assistance to about 1,825 units
annually with HOME funds.71
(4) Hope VI
HUD’s Hope VI program, started under the Clinton administration in 1992, rehabilitates
distressed public housing. The Hope VI Program has four main components: to change the shape
of a building or home; to establish incentives for resident self-sufficiency; to lessen concentrated
poverty by placing housing in low-poverty neighborhoods and to promote mixed-income
communities; and to forge cross-sector partnerships to leverage support and resources.72 The
Hope VI program has helped fund may rehabilitation projects in Philadelphia to date through the
allocation of funds to the local housing authority.
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(5) The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) Program
Run by the IRS, LIHTC is another important and wide-scale federal funding program that
has made it easier for the non-profit and private sectors to finance affordable housing projects.
The LIHTC program is “an indirect federal subsidy used to finance the development of
affordable rental housing for low-income households.”73 Andy Altman states that, “The lowincome tax credit program is the most effective federal funding program because one can easily
calculate the credits into a pro-forma, non-profit and for-profit developers can easily access the
funds, and the process as a whole is more efficient and less politicized than most other federal
funding programs.”74 Cities recieve LIHTC funds through state housing finance agencies, which
for Philadelphia is the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency (PHFA).75 PHFA and state
housing finance agencies in other urban cities allocate housing tax credits through a competitive
process.76 According to the HUD website:
The state allocating agency must develop a plan for allocating the credits consistent with
the state's Consolidated Plan. Federal law requires that the allocation plan give priority to
projects that (a) serve the lowest income families; and (b) are structured to remain
affordable for the longest period of time. Federal law also requires that 10 percent of each
state's annual housing tax credit allocation be set aside for projects owned by nonprofit
organizations.77
Tax credits can be claimed annually over a 10-year period by the property owner. However, the
developer usually syndicates, or sells the right to future credits in exchange for upfront cash, to
pay for immediate development costs.78
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(6) Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP)
NSP, authorized under Title III of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
“provides emergency assistance to state and local governments to acquire and redevelop
foreclosed properties that might otherwise become sources of abandonment or blight within their
communities.”79 By the NSP program enabling local governments to purchase abandoned homes,
neighborhoods can be stabilized and the decline of home values in neighboring areas is
lessened.80 Philadelphia, which has a local foreclosure rate of 5.7 percent, and a high local
abandonment risk, was allotted $16.83 million by the NSP program.81
The administration of federal affordable housing assistance is complex and fragmented,
as funds from multiple programs flow independently of one another to state housing finance
agencies, local public housing authorities and state and local departments of housing and
community development. These state and local agencies then decide how to implement the
funding. Therefore, while the entire public sector is critical in the strategic planning and
development phases of affordable housing, the federal government programs paint a policy
sphere which is programmatic and functional in nature due to the large focus on funding
allocation as opposed to specific national affordable housing goals.
B. State Governments
State-level programs serve as a connector between the federal and local levels. States
have large decision-making capabilities in terms of allocating money to different localities and
establishing standards which control the allocation process. They also have non-monetary
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authority in terms of creating an environment that encourages affordable housing production.
According Monica Sussman, “local governments largely affect the affordable housing process
through zoning and permitting laws, specifically inclusionary zoning.” The two state agencies
that play a large role in affordable housing in Philadelphia are the Department of Community &
Economic Development (DCED) and the Philadelphia Housing Finance Agency (PHFA).
(1) Department of Community & Economic Development (DCED)
DCED, administers housing and redevelopment funds which are distributed annually by the
state legislature.82 Philadelphia has used DCED funds for its home-repair programs, and to
finance homeownership and rental rehabilitation and new construction projects.83
(2) Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency (PHFA)
PHFA has a variety of financing strategies that it uses to help fund affordable housing. It
provides permanent financing for rental projects through a program called PennHOMES.84
PHFA also allocates Low-Income Housing Tax Credits to generate private investment in rental
projects and provides mortgages to homeowners.85 It is estimated that Pennsylvania will receive
$28.6 million in LIHTC funds to distribute to all of its jurisdictions for the 2009 cycle.86 In 2007,
the last year where a specific LIHTC project breakdown is available, three for-profit
development projects used a total of $1.8 million tax credits and five non-profit developments
used a total of $3.6 million in tax credits in Philadelphia.87
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C. Local Governments
Local governments are at the end of the affordable housing funding chain. Once they
receive federal and state funds, they use the money to produce housing opportunities. Local
governments are imperative in terms of effective allocation of funds due to their heightened
knowledge of the communities and geography of the area. At the local level in Philadelphia, five
main agencies exist which use funds from both the federal and state governments to implement
supply and demand-side affordable housing strategies.
(1) The Office of Housing & Community Development (OHCD)
OHCD is responsible for the creation of the Consolidated Plan and the housing budget as
well as the administration of federal HOME and CDBG and state DCED funds to other local
public sector agencies and private sector organizations.88 OHCD and the Deputy Mayor for
Planning and Economic Development are tasked with setting housing and community
development policy and implementing such policies and programs.89 The Director of Housing at
OHCD represents the mayor in the execution and management of city housing policy.90 OHCD
coordinates its planning with PHFA and DCED and contracts with other public agencies
including the Redevelopment Authority, the Philadelphia Housing Development Corporation and
non-profit organizations that conduct planning and perform services in line with the CDBG and
HOME programs.91
(2) The Redevelopment Authority (RDA)
RDA is an organization funded by federal financing programs that, according to John
Kromer, a Senior Consultant at the FELS Institute of Government who previously served for
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eight years as the Director of the City of Philadelphia’s Office of Housing & Community
Development, “makes the final decisions on affordable housing issues.”92 RDA which was
established in 1945 “was granted the powers of condemnation and the ability to buy and sell
property, and undertake programs for voluntary repair, rehabilitation and conservation.”93 RDA
administers multiple bond financed programs and housing production initiatives funded under
federal programs including CDBG and HOME.94
(3) The Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA)
PHA administers low-rent public housing and Housing Choice Vouchers. The mission of
PHA is to provide quality housing to low-income households, to educate residents and increase
opportunities for resident self-sufficiency, and to contribute to the environment.95 The PHA is
run by a five member Board of Commissioners, two of which are appointed by the City
Comptroller, two by the Mayor, and the fifth is chosen by the other four.96 PHA is unique
because it receives funds from and works directly with the federal government, as opposed to
receiving funds from OHCD. The redevelopment activities of PHA’s, which are largely funded
through Hope VI, help transform distressed neighborhoods and produce mixed-income rental and
homeownership units that serve low and moderate income households.97 PHA is currently
working on four housing projects funded by Hope VI which include the Martin Luther King,
Schuylkill Falls, Mill Creek and Richard Allen developments.98 The Martin Luther King and
Schuylkill Falls developments received roughly around $25 million each for revitalization and
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resident support services.99 The Mill Creek development received around $36 million for
demolition, revitalization and support services and the Richard Allen development received
about $13 million for revitalization and demolition.100 Additionally, PHA administers 11,000
vouchers annually.
(4) The Philadelphia Housing Trust Fund (HTF)
HTF was founded in 2005 to create a sustainable funding stream for affordable housing
by doubling document recording fees.101 Fifty percent of HTF funds will be used for programs
that increase the production of affordable housing for sale or rent.102 OHCD staffs the Housing
Trust Fund Oversight Board and the Director of Housing currently serves as the chair of the
board.103 HTF is different than the other four local public sector organizations because it uses
local funds, garnered from increasing local document recording fees. Each year HTF produces
about 275 units of affordable housing, assists with around 900 home repairs and preservation
initiatives and prevents nearly 1,000 families from becoming homeless.104
(5) The Philadelphia Housing Development Corporation (PHDC)
PHDC services Philadelphia’s low and moderate-income households by developing new
housing and rehabilitating existing homes through partnerships with Community Development
Corporations (CDCs). PHDC renovates vacant houses for sale to qualified buyers. The
organization also offers job opportunities to neighborhood residents through requests for
proposals, contracts and joint ventures associated with their housing projects.105 PHDC receives
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substantial CDBG funds from OHCD.106 The City has also designated PHDC to be a direct
recipient of state DCED funds. The grants fund most of PHDC’s programs and day-to day
activities.
The Private Sector
The multiple layers of government activity in the affordable housing process are also
complemented by non-profit and for-profit involvement. According to Andy Altman, “The city
issues an annual request for proposals (RFP) process in which non-profit CDCs and private
sector developers bid for projects.”107 Non-profit CDCs, for-profit developers and other private
sector players are the main participants in local affordable housing implementation.
(1) Non-profit CDCs
CDCs rehabilitate abandoned and deteriorating buildings for re-sale to low-income
populations, provide home repair programs and housing counseling, and build new homes in
cost-effective ways. OHCD, as well as all of the other local public agencies provide resources
including CDBG and HOME funds to activities sponsored by CDCs. An example of the trickle
down effect of federal funds can be seen in the CDC use of such finances. The People’s
Emergency Center, a CDC based in West Philadelphia, completed a five unit rental development
called the Imani House III with CDBG funds.108 The organization is also currently developing a
60-unit rental development called Cloisters III, and is looking to fund the project with LIHTC
dollars.109 Impact Services Corporation, another CDC developed two units of supportive rental
housing with DCED funding.110
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(2) For-Profit Developers
Many for-profit developers are involved in affordable housing development in
Philadelphia. The Housing Choice Voucher program enables private owners to rent to lowincome households. PHFA administered LIHTC funds have been used successfully by private
developers for financing.111 According to Monica Sussman, “Low-Income Housing Tax Credits
provide an incentive to make the private sector willing to produce affordable housing.”112
(3) Additional Private Sector Entities
Several additional private sector organizations offer financing for affordable housing
projects in Philadelphia. The Reinvestment Fund pools investments from individual and
institutional investors to provide a loan fund for housing development.113 The Local Initiatives
Support Coalition (LISC) provides project development funding for affordable housing
initiatives. The Philadelphia Urban Finance Corporation offers short-term financing for projects
using funds loaned by churches and other religious institutions.
In looking at the entire affordable housing arena in Philadelphia, the below chart sums up
each organizational entity and program, their sector affiliation, the direct recipient of their
services (funding or other), as well as their functions and leadership.
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Table A: The Affordable Housing Player Landscape in Philadelphia
Source of
Funding

Sector
Affiliation

Direct
Recipients of
funding/services

Public Housing &
Housing Choice
Voucher Program

Federal

Funds to the PHA

CDBG

Federal

State and local
governments

HOME

Federal

State and local
governments

Hope VI

Federal

PHAs

LIHTC

Federal

States

NSP

Federal

State and local
governments

DCED

State

PHFA

State

OHCD

Local

Local governments,
local private sector
actors
Local governments,
local private sector
actors
Local populations via
private sector
involvement

Functions

Provide funding for
low-income housing
production through
rehabilitation,
construction and offer
vouchers to purchase
privately owned rental
housing
Provide funding for
housing production
and economic
development
Provide funding to
build, buy and
rehabilitate affordable
housing, and provide
direct rental assistance
to low-income
populations
Provide funding for
physical
improvements,
management
improvements and
social and community
services to address
resident needs
Provide funding for
development of
affordable rental
housing
Provide funding to
acquire and develop
foreclosed properties
Administer housing
and redevelopment
funds
Provide funding for
rental projects and
allocate LIHTC funds
Writes Consolidated
Plan to receive
HOME & CDBG
funds, sets budget for
CDBG, HOME and
DCED funds, and
contracts with other
public agencies and
private sector to

Leadership

HUD

HUD

HUD

HUD

IRS/HUD

HUD

DCED head

PHFA head

Deputy Mayor for
Community &
Economic
Development, OHCD
head
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RDA

Local

Local populations via
private sector

PHA

Local

Local populations

HTF

Local

Local populations via
private sector
involvement

PHDC

Local

Local populations via
private sector
involvement

CDCs

Private Sector

Low-income
neighborhoods

Private sector
intermediaries

Private Sector

CDCs

For-profit
development
corporations

Private Sector

Local low-income
populations

administer CDBG and
HOME funds
Administer NSP
funds, and federal
dollars to preserve,
expand, and
rehabilitate affordable
housing stock
Administer low-rent
public housing, the
housing choice
voucher program and
Hope VI funds
Increase production of
affordable housing
through doubling
document recording
fees
Use federal and local
funds to for
partnerships with
private sector to build
and rehabilitate
affordable housing
and provide jobs to
residents
Affordable housing
production,
rehabilitation and
preservation and
provision of resident
services through
public and private
sector funds
Provide technical and
organizational
assistance and funding
to CDCs
Build affordable
housing units with
LIHTC and other
federal funds or due to
state or local land-use
regulations

Mayor (Chairman of
the Board)

PHA head

Director of Housing &
OHCD head

Mayor

Social entrepreneurs

Intermediary heads

For-profit developers

Analysis
Through exploring the processes and flow of funds between sectors, the fragmented
nature of the low-income housing system can be identified. Cross-sector partnerships can either
be centralized or decentralized. A decentralized partnership exists in a policy space where
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diverse actors are connected through common factors (in the case of affordable housing this
factor is funding) but not through one overarching goal or vision that directs the behavior and
actions of all the players involved. By looking at the function and leadership columns in the table
on Philadelphia (and as an extension most other urban areas in the U.S.) the decentralized model
is apparent based on several trends.114 First, although the federal programs that fund all of the
state, local and private sector players are led by HUD, the federal government remains absent
from the leadership columns of organizations with any other sector affiliation. So while the
federal government is the engine of the affordable housing process by providing funds that
trickle down to local implementation phases, it does not act as an engine in other ways such as
through providing specific goals and an overarching vision. A federal government leadership
deficit exists which results in fragmented and geographically varied outcomes of affordable
housing production based on different preferences and ideas in both local governments and the
private sector.
Second, the flow of the policy process is that the federal government provides funds, state
governments administer funds and local governments implement and use funds through
leveraging private sector participants. Private sector actors then have flexibility to use this
financing to produce, preserve and rehabilitate affordable housing in diverse locations within the
confines of the funding requirements. Therefore, the entire focus of the low-income housing
process is based on the use of funds. Each agency or organization acts individually to administer
and use federal and state funding. This is represented by the fact that most state and local
agencies depicted in the chart have different leaders and are not connected through one
individual force such as the mayor or governor. For example, both the state PHFA and the local
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OHCD administer funds in Philadelphia for the production of affordable housing to private
sector development organizations, but do not communicate or coordinate allocation activities
with each other. This point is illustrated by the absence of a political leader or representative
from OHCD or Philadelphia at PHFA board meetings for over two years.115
The current cross-sector partnership model that informs affordable housing policy,
execution and outcomes is decentralized due to the fact that distinct players operate in the policy
field with different ideas, conceptions, stereotypes and goals. Under such model, the common
elements are funding and the requirements directly related to such financing. According to
Stephanie Wall, an Outcomes Analyst at the People’s Emergency Center CDC in Philadelphia,
CDCs and for-profit developers have divergent conceptions of what the end product of
affordable housing should look like.116 She mentioned that while Pennrose properties, a for-profit
who partnered with the CDC on a project called Cloisters III, was solely interested in investing
dollars to build the development, some other for-profit and non-profit developers focus on
combining housing with neighborhood development and employment opportunities.117 As a
result, inefficiencies exist. According to Lester A. Salamon in his book Partners for Public
Service, while cross-sector partnerships’ presence in social service delivery is effective, some of
the weaknesses of the model are that programs get carved into narrow pieces that make them
hard to implement and the maintenance needs of private agencies often stunt public sector
goals.118 Based on such inefficiencies, Salamon gravitates toward the need for efficient crosssector partnerships that provide the maximal amount of value to those being served.119
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Another indicator of decentralization is that diverse organizations with different functions
use funds for overlapping purposes. In an interview, Monica Sussman mentioned that HUD is
incredibly unorganized in terms of its allocation process.120 She discussed how funds from each
federal program are administered within the confines of their own boundaries, and the allocation
of other funding streams for similar purposes is not taken into account.121 John Kromer said that,
“while CDBG and HOME funding allocation is managed through one division of HUD, public
housing and LIHTC have totally different processes.”122 He also remarked that the different
divisions need to be combined in order to give cities more flexibility in terms of the use of
funds.123
The results of the fragmentation at the top can be seen in its trickle down effect to state
and local levels, and ultimately the private sector. The lack of communication between state and
local levels results in an unequal distribution of funds across neighborhoods and creates a
competitive, as opposed to a collaborative, environment in which organizations can bid for and
use funds. According to Wall, “all of the state and local agencies have complicated and different
funding application processes.”124 Wall also discussed how the CDC spends a lot of staff time
and resources filling out different applications for DCED, PHFA and HOME & CDBG funds to
get money from distinct agencies for similar purposes.125 The decentralized low-income housing
process is therefore inefficient because too great a percentage of federal funds and state and local
resources are wasted due to the flow of funding through different channels and frequencies to
private sector organizations with overlapping goals and geographic affiliations. While certain
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projects are successful, economies of scale in terms of the most effective use of monetary and
human resources is not achieved and the long-term growing affordability issue is not adequately
addressed.
Another example of the inefficiency and lack of intergovernmental coordination in the
decentralized process is that in Philadelphia, many opportunities to leverage additional public
sector funds have been missed. In 2003, when there was a rise in the amount of Low-Income
Housing Tax Credits given to PHFA, more than $6 million of the tax credits were not distributed
due to a lack of project applications, which is evidence of a likely lack of knowledge regarding
the availability of the tax credits.126 The $6 million could have generated over $45 million in
private investments for affordable rental housing.127 Thus holes or blind spots in the actual
implementation of affordable housing and its results exist. Under the decentralized model, the
local policy field is comprised of many actors fighting for resources, as opposed to working
together under a pre-determined set of goals.
The decentralized system is directly tied to the lack of coordinated and focused public
sector leadership and vision which helps inform the actions and roles of other public and private
sector actors. Thus a centralized model can be defined as a permeable federal vision that would
trickle down to local levels through public sector leadership and unification. A centralized
system would have similar public and private functions based on the implementation of specific
national and locally applicable goals across all sectors. The administration of federal funds
would be a tool to achieve these larger goals, and would not be the face of the entire low-income
housing process. If the federal government creates a set agenda that state and local political
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systems carried out by fitting private sector actors into different pieces of the plan based on their
strengths, a collaborative atmosphere can be achieved, affordable housing production and
strategies within regions can be streamlined, and the system as a whole can more become visionbased as opposed to project-based. When a vision exists, the different natures, opinions and
preferences of the sectors can be better harnessed, and their divergent strengths can be
synthesized. A central vision led by the federal government and its state and local public sector
counterparts would enable local public sectors to use their private sector organizations and
fellow government agencies to fit into a big picture that would ultimately aid not just specific
communities, but the area’s or region’s housing patterns in general.
Conclusion
The decentralized cross-sector partnership system is inefficient due to the lack of
communication, unification and vision amongst the diverse players in the affordable housing
policy field. An alternative model, a centralized cross-sector partnership system is proposed as
being a more effective affordable housing strategy. But how can the policy arena transition from
the decentralized to the centralized model? The next section explores this question by discussing
how a new leadership strategy in which a unified public sector, led by the federal government,
can drive this change and effectively leverage private sector core-competencies. While this
transition seems subtle, it has far-reaching positive consequences for increasing the opportunity
for new innovation and advancement in the low-income housing arena.

45

Chapter 3: Vision for Reform—Centralized Partnership Model
Introduction
As depicted in the Philadelphia analysis, the current affordable housing system is based
on the application of primarily federal funding streams to address low-income housing needs. As
a result, the function of the public sector is to allocate funds to private sector partners to
implement in an uncoordinated manner, not to focus on overarching goals that could drive the
successful and directed use of financial support. Leadership within the sphere is fragmented and
lacks coordination and communication. To address the negative results of the decentralized
model, the function and leadership variables, as shown in the table on Philadelphia, need to be
altered through public sector unification, leadership and collaboration. Thus public sector
leadership should be defined as the ability to get other public and private sector players in the
affordable housing arena to adopt, implement and expand a single vision. While the centralized
partnership model is still complex, as the same diverse actors inhabit the industry, the structure is
vision-based as opposed to solely project-based. A system should exist in which state and local
governments have significant decision-making power within a framework of federal incentives,
standards and performance measures that revolve around specific goals.128 Ultimately, the
successful application of the model will allow for the core-competencies of each sector to be
utilized, while downplaying sector weaknesses.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section defines the conceptual
framework for the centralized partnership model through identifying the players involved and
their roles in the revised structure. The second section illustrates a scenario in which the practical
implementation of this altered system occurs. A three-pronged vision is proposed based on
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critical affordable housing issues that have both national relevance and opportunities for local
innovation and differentiation. Each element of the vision is introduced and then the necessary
federal incentives, state and local leadership roles and private sector presence to achieve the
vision are explored.
A. Leadership Structure & Players
1. Federal Government Role
While no one level of government or sector can tackle the U.S.’s affordable housing
challenges, a holistic affordable housing strategy requires a more vigorous, systematic,
innovative and collaborative federal government.129 The national government, which is
represented by HUD, is the only player that has the fiscal capacity to create housing and
neighborhood policies which attempt to combat the consequences of limited wage growth,
increasing income inequality, and rising prices nationwide. Furthermore, it is only the federal
government, based on its fiscal capacity, that can motivate and drive other affordable housing
players including local governments and the private sector to implement effective policies and
programs.
While federal programs including LIHTC, HOME and CDBG have been the main tools
for affordable housing production and rent reductions, they are not sufficient in that they do not
constitute a necessary integrated national housing policy.130 Also, while a few state and local
governments are taking actions to mitigate the affordability gap through policies such as
inclusionary zoning, higher minimum wages and other regulatory initiatives, their potential
impact is limited due to the absence of strong federal government leadership that encourages the
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creation of such land-use policies. 131 The public sector, led by the federal government, thus
needs to chart the course for the future of affordable housing, and take a more direct and
involved stance. Player interdependence in the low-income housing process must be fostered by
the federal government through a comprehensive plan that addresses big-picture affordable
housing needs and goals.
In order to drive this new centralized process, the federal government must first define an
affordable housing vision, or national priorities in relation to low-income housing. For such
vision to have a meaningful long-term effect on state and local governments, and ultimately the
private sector, the federal government needs to provide ample incentive structures including tax,
regulatory, and other monetary incentives to state and local levels.132 Thus the backbone of the
modified system will be federal incentives, as well as leadership from HUD in terms of vision
creation, that demand local public and private sector leadership and investment in affordable
housing policy and implementation in accordance with specific goals.
2. State Government Role
States should continue acting as a medium between the federal and local levels. However,
instead of just being a connector for allocating federal and state funds, they should also provide
additional incentives to local governments within their jurisdiction to adopt the federal vision.
These incentives and policies could include zoning ordinances, as well as regional planning and
funding allocation requirements that are in line with federal goals. Increased communication
between state and local levels should be required, fostered and rewarded by state governments. A
competitive funding application process for state and federal funds allocated at the state level
should be initiated in which local governments are encouraged to set up a holistic strategy where
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the federal vision is applied to place-based demographics and housing needs. Cities who present
a unified affordable housing strategy under the mayor or a subsidiary of the mayor that addresses
the federal vision in innovative place-specific ways should be given priority in terms of funding.
It would be effective if states required local governments to include plans in their applications
for how they will leverage directed private sector participation through cross-sector partnerships.
Since the low-income housing process is so complex and operates on so many levels, state
governments are necessary to help inspire local creativity as well as to provide feedback to the
federal government in terms of the effectiveness of its vision and its funding programs and
incentives.
3. Local Government Role
Local governments have one of the most important and hands-on roles in the new
centralized cross-sector partnership model due to the fact that they turn the federal vision into a
reality through policy implementation. They need to individualize the federal vision through
innovative strategies and unification under the mayor’s office. Local governments, in this new
structure, form and give direction to private sector partners. Local government leaders need to
recognize the strengths of their private sector base, and assist in the partnership formation
process by leveraging entities with complementary strengths and weaknesses, so diverse interests
and voices can be balanced.
Philadelphia and Boston are compared to illustrate the difference that local level
leadership and vision can make in terms of policy innovation and implementation. The major
policy documents produced by the two cities—Philadelphia’s Year 34 Consolidated Plan for
CDBG and HOME funds and Boston’s Leading the Way strategy— are used as a basis for
comparison because they possess the cities’ most comprehensive affordable housing
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strategies.133 Philadelphia is used because it is the norm for most urban areas in terms of policy
formation and implementation based on the allocation and use of federal funds. Boston is used
because it is an exceptional example of the personal investment the mayor has exercised in
coming up with a local affordable housing strategy. Each city’s documents will be judged based
on four criteria: vision, leadership, private sector inclusion and outcome measurement and policy
improvement. These criteria were chosen because they touch on the core principles that define
and determine the success of the centralized partnership model. An analysis follows the
comparison.
Boston
Leadership:
Boston’s Leading the Way (LTW) affordable housing strategy, which has been in
existence since 2000, is led by Mayor Menino. The three main government agencies in Boston,
the Boston Housing Authority (BHA), the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), and the
Department of Neighborhood Development (DND), have worked collaboratively to implement
the mayor’s housing strategy. LTW, while initiated by Mayor Menino, was created with input
from the government agencies and the mayor’s housing advisory panel, comprised of private
sector leaders, representatives from banks and other financial institutions and the Director of
Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies.134
Vision:
The vision set out by Mayor Menino in LTW II, spanning from 2003 to 2007, was
grounded by four broad goals: creating 2,100 units of new affordable housing; preserving 3,000
units of affordable rental housing; implementing a $10 million expansion in the City’s efforts to
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house the homeless; and investing in neighborhoods at risk from the effects of the economic
downturn.135 The new vision set out for LTW III, which was released in March 2009 and will be
in effect until 2012, articulated the vision of: producing 1,000 new units of affordable rental
housing; reducing Boston’s family homeownership and long-term homelessness for individual
residents by 50 percent; and repairing, renovating or redeveloping at least 5,000 units of public
housing.136
Private Sector Inclusion:
Both non-profit CDCs and for-profit developers are involved in the LTW strategy.
Through a competitive RFP process for specific projects, CDCs and for-profit developers
contribute to building new affordable housing. CDCs produced 63 percent of the city’s desired
production target in LTW II.137 For-profit developers were involved through a new inclusionary
development policy in which 10 percent of their units for sale had to be sold at affordable
prices.138 Due to this new policy, for-profit developers have preserved over 5,000 at risk rental
units.139 Additionally, the city incorporated CDCs into the solution for its expiring use issue
through facilitating the process by which they could purchase expiring units and sell them at
affordable prices to low-income individuals or families.140
Outcome Measurement & Policy Improvement:
LTW II achieved the majority of the goals set out in its vision: 2,213 units of affordable
housing were created, 3,569 units of affordable rental housing were preserved including 577
units of public housing that had been reclaimed through redevelopment and rehabilitation, and a
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more effective method of preventing homelessness was established by the creation of the Boston
Homeless Prevention Clearinghouse.141 The LTW vision was achieved because of the specific
and coordinated planning that occurred to implement these goals. For example, there is an entire
section in the report on rental unit preservation and what players were tasked with preservation
responsibilities. LTW II exceeded the pivotal goal of preserving 3,000 units of affordable
housing by defining three sub-goals which were: preserve units with expiring federal/state
affordability restrictions, preserve public housing through renovation and redevelopment, and
preserve other privately owned units under physical or financial distress.142 The city partnered
with and tasked the Community Economic Development Assistance Corporation (CEDAC) with
preserving expiring use properties.143 The Boston Housing Authority was tasked with preserving
deteriorating public housing and redeveloping the 55 year old Franklin Hill public housing
development. The Authority also developed an “Approach to Preservation” draft, laying out
creative initiatives that would generate over $150 million for critical repairs in the public housing
community over the next decade.144
Philadelphia
Leadership:
Philadelphia’s Year 34 Consolidated Plan is operated under the auspices of Deborah
McColloch, the Director of OHCD. McColloch represents Mayor Nutter in the management and
execution of city housing policy. McColloch and the OHCD are responsible for organizing and
administering the Consolidated Plan. OHCD contracts with other affordable housing
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organizations such as the RDA, PHDC and private sector entities to implement CDBG, HOME
and other state and federal funds.
Vision:
The three goals of the Consolidated Plan are: to create suitable living environments, to
provide decent affordable housing, and to create economic opportunities.145 The priority needs
established under the plan are: affordable housing, homelessness, non-homeless special needs,
and non-housing community development. The report also says that Philadelphia will be
pursuing certain priorities due to HUD requirements, which include: coming up with strategies
for neighborhood revitalization, geographic allocation of resources, removing barriers to
affordable housing, improving institutional structure and coordination, as well as instituting
public housing resident initiatives.
Private Sector Inclusion:
The various roles of non-profit CDCs and for-profit developers are outlined in the
Consolidated Plan. The Consolidated Plan says that, “CDCs may rehabilitate vacant and
deteriorated buildings for resale to low or moderate-income buyers or for rental purposes. Some
CDCs also sponsor job banks or training programs, provide housing counseling, operate homerepair programs, or undertake commercial development…OHCD’s policy is to provide a
substantial portion of its resources to housing activities sponsored by CDCs.”146 The report also
mentions that OHCD works closely with the Philadelphia Association of Community
Development Corporations, a non-profit that supports CDCs through technical assistance and
advocacy. For-profit developers are involved in the process through the Housing Choice
Voucher program and OHCD’s RFP process.
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Outcome Measurement & Policy Improvement:
While the Consolidated Plan sets annual housing completion goals which include
projections of how many people will be served and how many units will be created, the
benchmarks are based on fulfilling what is necessary based on CDBG and HOME funding
requirements. Indicators of success and the amount of funding necessary to complete projects in
line with the plan objectives are outlined. For example, one indictor for the affordability
objective is to create 160 low and moderate income households in stable housing
developments.147 The funding necessary for the project is projected to be around $3 million.148
Who will be carrying out these indicators and during what timeframe is not discussed in the plan.
Additionally, no goals and outcomes from the previous year’s consolidated plan were mentioned
in the document.
Analysis:
Boston’s strategy is more holistic and comprehensive than Philadelphia’s because it
defines specific needs, sets strategies for how to achieve targeted goals, and assigns specific roles
to public sector agencies and private sector organizations. As a result of Boston’s unified
approach, private sector core-competencies were better utilized. For example, due to the specific
RFP process based on strategy goals, the housing production created under LTW was evenly
distributed across Boston’s diverse array of neighborhoods. The city used regulatory restrictions
and incentives to get for-profit developers on board to build affordable housing units in higher
income areas, and provided funding to organized CDCs, who were most in touch with specific
neighborhood needs and concern, to build affordable units.
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In contrast, Philadelphia set out three broad objectives which at best illuminated a vague
vision. Furthermore, its lack of coordination between public sector agencies and private sector
players prevent the Consolidated Plan from being comprehensive. For example, OHCD
contracted out federal funds to build projects to other government agencies and the private
sector. As a result, affordable housing production was unorganized and varied by neighborhood.
Boston, on the other hand, had all of its affordable housing agencies collaboratively divide up
and use funds for specific assigned purposes that fit into the mayor’s vision. The Philadelphia
plan is created for and reactive to the purpose of receiving and distributing federal funds. The
process is programmatic and functional, as opposed to organized and visionary. In Philadelphia,
local government agencies as well as CDCs and private developers are all described as separate
actors with their own agendas. Thus the affordable housing process in Philadelphia is not unified,
but fragmented and decentralized.
Another positive effect of Boston’s holistic strategy is its ability to set specific production
targets and track the success of the players carrying out the goals. While Philadelphia attempted
to set indicators of success that were in line with its core objectives, the fact that the indicators
were unclear in terms of who would be carrying out projects to fulfill these goals, when they
would occur and where they would be located diminishes their potential and effectiveness. The
lack of communication between the players in Philadelphia’s local affordable housing sphere, as
evidenced by the lack of delineation of the relationships between the diverse players that plan
and implement housing objectives, undermines Philadelphia’s ability to track success in a
detailed and accurate manner.
Conrad Egan, the CEO and President of the National Housing Conference, believes that
for a city to have a strong affordable housing policy, an inspirational leader must be behind its
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inception.149 Egan also says that such leaders are hard to come by and that their leadership is not
due to training, but rather to personal priorities. Mayor Menino falls into this exceptional
category.150 Egan discussed that other than Mayor Menino, Mayor Daley of Chicago and to a
lesser extent Mayor Fenty of Washington D.C., most local leaders do not inspire the creation of
strong affordable housing policies in which intergovernmental and private sector coordination
occurs.151 There is thus a major correlation between political leadership, vision creation and
coordinated and effective affordable housing policies. Philadelphia is the norm in terms of its
lack of local level leadership and vision. Therefore, to be able to enhance and encourage
leadership such as in Boston and to create holistic low-income housing strategies at the local
level, federal and state involvement in setting a vision and providing incentives for local leaders
to carry out a unified approach to the vision, as Mayor Menino did in LTW, is imperative. The
entire centralized system, with the federal government at its core, is meant to pave the way for
successful local public sector leadership and performance.
4. Public Sector Coordination
While the federal, state and local governments all have distinct roles in the centralized
partnership model, coordination is key to the successful completion of a holistic process. Monica
Sussman mentioned that currently there is a lack of trust between the levels of the public sector
due to state and local governments having a fearful mindset of the federal government and the
ongoing continuity of federal funds.152 John Kromer discussed how it is important that there is a
direct leadership line in the public sector.153 The affordable housing vision and goals set out by
HUD should be adopted by state and local leaders who are responsible for the production of
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affordable housing and the use of federal dollars.154 However, in order for this strategy to be
effective, positive collaboration must occur.
A system must exist in which state and local governments possess authority within the
framework of the federal vision and standards. A task-force should be conducted with housing
policy experts, non-profit and business leaders, governors and mayors to help clarify and assign
such roles, to determine how public sector leaders can best communicate, and to develop a
comprehensive and practical mission statement for the U.S.’s housing vision and policies.
Federal, state and local leaders must form a feedback loop in which state and local governments
inform HUD on major housing needs and concerns. HUD can then respond to the feedback by
continually altering and updating the affordable housing vision to meet wide-spread local
concerns. The feedback loop is critical because it enhances intergovernmental communication
and coordination and enables the branches of government to provide checks on one another to
balance out existing faults such as the local practice of exclusionary zoning policies.
5. Private Sector Role: For-Profit Developers & Non-Profit CDCs
The core-competencies of non-profit and for-profit entities need to be leveraged
successfully by a unified local public sector strategy, which in turn has to be motivated by
federal and state incentives. In the for-profit realm, the private sector’s voice of reason must be
brought to the table and taken seriously. In the non-profit arena, CDCs need to be able to
advocate for low-income residents and serve the neighborhoods to which they are bound. When
local governments carry out projects that are in line with the public sector vision, they should
provide the non-profit and for-profit players involved with guidance in terms of specific target
goals and how a project fits into the larger national low-income housing agenda. When non-
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profit and for-profit entities are directed to a specific end goal by public sector leaders, they can
avoid tensions based on differing values and focus all of their energies on using their corecompetencies. Therefore, local governments must have a greater stake in the partnership
formation process, and steer the partnerships to the point where private sector players are doing
what they do best. This process will maximize efficiency because it allows each player to have a
part in the overall goal based on its strengths. The process will at the same time minimize sector
weaknesses by not putting a for-profit or a non-profit entity in charge of every detail from predevelopment to end goals.
6. Private Sector Role: National Non-Profit Intermediaries
The coordination and communication between the public and private sectors should be
enhanced by non-profit intermediary involvement. The public sector must work closely with
non-profit intermediary leaders including Enterprise Community Partners, LISC and
Neighborworks America, to help formulate standards that can guide local practices and policies
and educate the public, local governments, and private sector organizations. National non-profit
intermediaries currently engage citywide organizations, government foundations, financial
institutions and community organizations in collaborative efforts to effect community-based
neighborhood revitalization.155 Intermediaries support non-profit CDCs through facilitating the
funding process, linking for-profit and non-profit organizations interested in partnerships and
encouraging long-term planning.156 While non-profit intermediaries provide important sources of
funding to CDCs, they also have helped CDCs develop and improve their capacity-building,
leadership and production systems.157 Non-profit intermediaries need to continue playing a
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critical role in the affordable housing process by acting as a bridge between national policies and
vision and local implementation through the existence of their national and local offices and their
ties to all three sectors. They are thus an important check in the new centralized partnership
model, and provide another source of unification based on their collaboration with the multiple
levels of the public and private sectors.
B. Centralized Partnership Model Vision Scenario
In this section, a scenario is used to illustrate how the centralized process might work and
its policy implications. In such scenario, three goals drive an overarching federal vision. While
the federal agenda could take on many forms, these goals were chosen based on a study of the
most pressing current affordable housing issues and their national importance as well as local
applicability. The federal vision for affordable housing should revolve around three core
elements: integration; strategic community development; and smart growth and regional housing.
This section undertakes an in-depth analysis of these three elements of the proposed affordable
housing vision and why such factors are important and need to be addressed. Further analysis is
also done on: the different federal and state incentives necessary to coordinate local public sector
leadership and facilitate effective private sector involvement, and the specific roles of the
federal, state and local governments as well as the private sector in carrying out such wide-scale
goals. The vision and federal and state incentives discussed are meant to operate alongside the
framework of the current federal funding streams, as these programs have already been set to
dominate the affordable housing sphere for the next eight years under the new HUD Secretary
Shaun Donovan.158 Thus, the federal and state level incentives that are necessary to advance the
vision will revolve around restructuring the application processes of the current funding streams
as opposed to creating an entirely new financial system.
158
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1. Vision Significance
Integration
The integration component of the affordable housing vision includes the promotion of
racial and economic diversity through mixed-income housing. According to Conrad Egan, the
concept of mixed-income housing must be preserved and must include households with the
lowest incomes.159 Mixed-income housing serves many purposes. If implemented correctly it can
be a cost-effective method of producing affordable housing and can prevent further concentration
of poverty in inner-city areas, thus resulting in increased racial and economic integration.
A growing body of research indicates that living in high poverty areas can put families
and youth at risk, and that affordable housing alone cannot revitalize blighted neighborhoods.160
However, racial and economic segregation is currently widespread. A national housing analysis
of the location of public assisted housing indicated that 37 percent of such housing is located in
areas where the poverty level is greater than 40 percent.161 Minority residents of public housing
are often concentrated in high-poverty communities. Additionally, NIMBYis is still very
prevalent in state and local policies and in residents’ sentiments.162 Housing supported by LIHTC
is mainly located in neighborhoods where residents are minorities. About 12 percent are located
in neighborhoods where less than 20 percent of the population is minority; 39 percent are located
in neighborhoods where 21 to 79 percent are minority, and almost half are located in areas with
large minority communities and with poverty rates of 80 percent or higher.163 Below is a graph
which indicates the extent of racial isolation in affordable housing.

159

Conrad Egan 2/27/2009
Katz et al., “Rethinking Local Affordable Housing,” 18.
161
Katz et al., “Rethinking Local Affordable Housing,” 18.
162
“Not in my backyard,” or NIMBYism, is a common reference to negative middle and upper class stereotypes
regarding the poor and minority communities.
163
Katz et al, “Rethinking Local Affordable Housing,” 18.
160

60

Figure 2: Percentage of Metro Area Households Living in Center Cities
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“America’s Rental Housing, The Key to a Balanced National Policy,” Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard
University (2008): 20.

An example of successful integrated affordable housing is in the Murphy Park area of St.
Louis, Missouri. The developer McCormack, Baron & Associates transformed the George L.
Vaughn High Rises into a mixed-income area that included townhomes, garden apartments, and
single family homes. The goal of the project was to increase diversity and promote sustainable
economic performance.164 The firm partnered with corporate and philanthropic groups to
improve the local school and worked with neighborhood residents and its non-profit wing Urban
Strategies to formulate the COVAM Community Development Corporation to unify the residents
and coordinate community services in Murphy Park and its surrounding neighborhoods.165 In
contrast to other areas with a large amount of affordable housing units in St. Louis, there have
been rising employment levels and property values in Murphy Park.166 Performance at the local
school increased, with the percentage of students reading at their normal grade level moving
from under 20 percent to 60 percent.167 The median household income rose by 18 percent within
a ten year span compared to 4 percent regionally.168 Private investment in residential and
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commercial development has located in the surrounding area since the development.169 The
Murphy Park development shows that integrated affordable housing policy can have large
positive effects on low-income populations and can help revitalize neighborhoods and promote
diversity. However, while mixed-income developments have gained momentum in scholarly
debate, the majority of affordable housing units across the nation are located in high poverty
areas in urban centers.
Pro-affordable housing regulatory land-use incentives including inclusionary zoning and
permitting requirements should be used as the key tools to foster public leadership and
implementation of the integration prong of the national vision. Currently, many states and
localities use local zoning and land use policies to exclude lower-cost housing and its diverse
array of residents so as to increase local property values and avoid racial and socio-economic
tensions. Historically, early zoning ordinances in the South were designed to separate black and
white residents.170 Although such ordinances were ruled unconstitutional in 1917, local
governments have continued to this day to adopt indirectly racial ordinances.171 The regulations
that are most detrimental to racial and economic integration are low-density zoning and building
permit caps, as they discourage the production of lower-cost homes and create incentives to build
larger, more-expensive homes.172
Nico Calavita and Alan Mallach in their article “Inclusionary Housing, Incentives, and
Land Value Recapture,” mention that “Inclusionary Housing may not be a panacea for the
nation’s housing affordability problem, but it can be a significant, locally based component of an
overarching strategy in which the federal and state governments must also play significant
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roles.”173 Regulatory policies such as inclusionary zoning are important ways to promote
integrated communities and to garner for-profit and non-profit involvement. The use of a proaffordable housing zoning policy in California provides an empirical example that illustrates how
inclusionary zoning can be a successful cross-sector policy to induce affordable mixed-income
housing production. California requires its local governments to adopt housing elements in their
mandatory general plans. The state mandates that each local government must develop plans and
programs and identify sites to accommodate affordable housing.174 The State Department of
Housing and Community Development reviews these local plans, which are revised every five
years.175 While penalties for noncompliance are weak, California’s laws on housing strategies are
prescriptive and innovative.
An example of the trickle down effect of California’s state policies can be seen in the city
of Pleasanton in the eastern Bay Area. Pleasanton’s slogan, “The City of Planned Progress” has
been driven by elected officials and citizens.176 Pleasanton has a 25 year history of affordable
housing planning, has a housing specialist in its planning department and involves public
housing authorities in development.177 The Pleasanton Inclusionary Zoning ordinance requires a
set-aside of 15 percent of multi-family dwellings as affordable to low and very-low income
populations.178 Inclusionary units must be dispersed so as to create mixed-income areas, and
must be identical to other market-rate units in terms of quality.179 The city uses in-lieu fees as an
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incentive to private developers to encourage them to build affordable housing as opposed to
opting out.180
While the California and Pleasanton programs had positive results, pro-affordable housing
land-use policies are largely confined to a few states. California, New Jersey and Massachusetts
account for 56 percent of the jurisdictions that offer regulatory incentives.181 For example, nearly
nine out of ten jurisdictions in California have incentive programs.182 Only about 5 percent of the
jurisdictions in the 50 biggest metropolitan areas are estimated to have inclusionary zoning
ordinances.183 California again leads the use of inclusionary zoning, as 35 percent of its
jurisdictions use these ordinances.184 Such percentage indicates that state leadership and policies
largely affect local leadership and the actual implementation of regulatory policies through the
creation of ordinances. Due to the lack of wide-scale pro-affordable housing land-use policies
driven by the public sector, incentives are needed at the federal and state levels to inspire local
public sector leadership that can drive these important land-use policies and as an extension
mixed-income and integrated housing.
Strategic Community Development
To maximize the positive effects of mixed-income housing on low-income households,
strategic community development objectives and programs should co-exist with and complement
affordable housing. Strategic community development is comprised of combining housing
development and rehabilitation with economic development, school improvement, employment
and training, healthcare, childcare and other social services.185 There have been multiple
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successful strategic community development initiatives started by private sector for-profit and
non-profit organizations. In the Murphy Park example already discussed, Urban Strategies, the
non-profit arm of the developer McCormack, Baron & Associates (MBA) focused on the socioeconomic aspects of the mixed-income affordable housing development.186 The CEO of MBA
sought to establish a year round community school that could serve students, provide access to
computer and technology networks and offer job training for parents.187 MBA partnered with St.
Louis Public Schools to revitalize the Jefferson public school and created COVAM to ensure
resident participation in the development process.188 The partnership established a residential
leadership team that identified neighborhood needs and created a strategic plan.189 With support
from HUD and $3.5 million from private funds, the Jefferson school was renovated and an adult
computer lab was created.190 The positive results within the Murphy Park neighborhood
previously mentioned would not have been possible without both the renovation of the Jefferson
school and the resident participation that was fostered by Urban Strategies.
Another good example of the success of community revitalization within a mixed-income
housing development is Homan Square in Chicago’s North Lawndale Community. Homan
Square is an effort by the Shaw Company (a private developer), the City of Chicago and other
partners to provide housing, economic development and a community center. The Homan Square
Community Center campus was opened in 2001 and offers health and family services.191 The
City of Chicago donated $15 million for the construction of the community center.192 A 39,000
square foot recreation wing, opened and run by the Chicago Park District which includes a pool,
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gym and recreational meeting rooms, as well as two acres of playing fields was built and is
actively used by residents.193 Additionally, a 22,000 square foot Child and Family Center built
by the YMCA of Chicago provides preschool and daycare to more than 3000 children.194
The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative, a non-profit and community based planning
entity rooted in the Roxbury/North Dorchester neighborhoods of Boston is another example of
enhancing supportive services through visionary local leadership. The initiative is an innovative
strategic community development effort. The organization builds human, social and physical
infrastructure through its focus on community economic development, leadership development,
cross-sector collaboration and youth opportunities and development.195 As a result of this
grassroots neighborhood effort more than half of the 1300 abandoned parcels have been
transformed into over 400 new affordable homes, schools, community centers, Dudley Town
Common, community greenhouses, parks, playgrounds, an orchard and other public spaces.196
Due to the comprehensive community services offered, residents have increasingly taken pride in
the neighborhood and its revitalization.197 The organization has grown into a collaborative effort
between over 3,000 residents, businesses, non-profits, CDCs, banks, government agencies,
corporations and foundations.198
While initiatives such as Murphy Park in St. Louis, the Dudley Street Neighborhood
Initiative in Boston, and Homan Square in Chicago indicate the importance of comprehensive
community services that complement affordable housing and neighborhood development, widescale initiation of such services can only be adopted through public sector leadership, as
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indicated by how rare these collaborative projects are. According to the Millennial Housing
Commission’s report, strategic community development “requires a combination of federal
support, state leadership, and local innovation.199 Unfortunately, due to the fact that the federal
funding process is fragmented and requires distinct planning, performance standards and
eligibility determinations, many barriers exist to the implementation of additional community
services alongside affordable housing and mixed-income developments.200 Funding additional
supportive services such as employment, training and enhanced transportation in connection with
affordable housing involves multiple agencies with different organizational structures. The
barriers discussed above drive up costs and discourage the inclusion of community services
affordable housing developments.201 It is up to public sector leaders at all levels to overcome
these barriers and make low-income housing development not just about building units, but
about big-picture goals such as resident self-sufficiency and the reduction of poverty.
Smart Growth & Regional Housing
The need for much enhanced regional housing and smart growth policies is due to the
increasingly wide-scale decentralization of economic and residential life. Cities have lost over
7.4 million middle and upper income households that “form the backbone of economically strong
communities,” while only gaining 3.5 million of such households.202 Historically, urban
neighborhoods were located close to entry-level jobs, but today’s employment opportunities are
often inaccessible for low-income communities in urban neighborhoods to reach.203 The
sprawling economic growth has had negative effects on general public well-being through traffic
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congestion and workforce productivity due to long commutes that shorten the day.204
Additionally, the health risks of the current decentralized development patterns are incredibly
negative. Low-density, auto-dependent communities are linked to a higher rate of health
problems including a growing number of asthma victims.205 Walking or riding a bike to school,
the most basic exercise patterns for kids are only taken by one in eight kids due to land-use and
zoning standards.206
The current negative externalities of metropolitan communities have sparked interest in
regional solutions, but in reality, housing policy discussions remain local.207 Regions as opposed
to individual jurisdictions are the appropriate spaces in which to be thinking about affordable
housing.208 Enabling low-income families to live near employment centers and transportation
nodes will create an overall improved balance between jobs and housing that will stunt some of
the negative factors that are associated with current regional growth patterns.209 Smart growth
and regional housing development involves policies that are tailored to meet community,
economic and environmental needs. These policies invest time in both the restoration of
communities and developing new, more-town centered developments that are transit and
pedestrian oriented.210 The principles that underlie smart growth and the resulting regional
housing development policies are: mixed land uses; housing opportunities for a range of
household types; attractive communities with a significant sense of place; preservation of open
space; reinvesting in existing communities to promote more balanced regional development;
providing multiple transportation choices; making development cost-effective and fair; and
204
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encouraging citizen participation.211 While criticism of this concept has arisen due to instances
where such policies limit the amount of land available and drive up housing prices, these
occurrences are largely based on the application of growth management controls which aim to
limit growth as opposed to comprehensive smart growth strategies.212
Smart growth enables community development efforts at the neighborhood level to be
connected to broader regional development goals and decisions such as infrastructure
development patterns and transportation policies.213 The policy concept has also attracted diverse
advocates from across multiple sectors including environmentalists, housing developers, local
and regional government bodies, and transportation and community development advocates.214 It
is only through such a large and diverse base that affordable housing can become an accepted
issue in the U.S. community and that resolutions and strategies to complicated development
issues can be created and implemented.
New Jersey is the only state that has a regional system that could be looked at as a case
study. In 1975, in response to exclusionary zoning in Mt. Laurel, New Jersey’s Supreme Court
ruled that all localities had to provide a realistic opportunity for fair-share housing for
households making less than 80 percent of the area median income.215 In 1983, the State passed a
Fair Housing Act, which created a quasi-judicial administrative agency called the Council on
Affordable Housing (COAH).216 An incentive was given to municipalities that had an affordable
housing plan approved by COAH. In such cases, the municipality would be protected from
developer lawsuits.217 According to COAH, its work has enabled the creation of 26,800 new
211
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affordable units and the rehabilitation of 10,400 units, as well as imposed less restrictive zoning
on 14,600 units.218 Although the court decision included all municipalities, the COAH process is
voluntary, and 260 of the state’s 566 municipalities participate.219 Making participation
mandatory in this plan, as well as in other regional plans would increase the program’s
effectiveness.220 While the New Jersey program is promising, the political compromise struck
that allows municipalities to pay another developer in a distinct location to build their fair-share
housing undermines the idea of regional fair-share housing. Such political compromise
highlights the important need for political leadership in promoting affordable housing and
regional planning.
2. Public Sector Incentive Structures & Player Roles
Federal Government Role
HUD needs to provide incentives to state and local levels through the use federal funding
streams to expand affordable housing production to include the three prongs of the federal
vision: integrated housing, strategic community development and smart and regional growth.
In order to turn the federal vision required in a centralized partnership model into a reality, the
federal government should put together a distinct task force under HUD control comprised of
federal, state and local leaders as well as for-profit and non-profit developers, experts from
strategic community development programs such as the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative,
social service practitioners, and transportation and urban planning and design experts. This task
force will discuss broad goals in terms of the effective provision of mixed-income housing,
strategic community development and regional and smart growth and ways to help make federal
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and state funding more conducive to promoting, as opposed to hindering, the implementation of
a unified vision.
The Millennial Housing Commission believes that state and local government leaders
need to have the tools to respond in a coordinated fashion to locally unique, comprehensive
development projects.221 Federal government leadership must create a consolidated review
process that crosses program boundaries and streamlines funding administration so as not to
drain public and private sector energies and strengths through conflicting, overlapping and
duplicative demands for information.222 The Millennial Housing Commission recommends
implementing a new potent community development tool that would build on the lessons of
successful affordable housing projects and unify funding regulations for such comprehensive
projects.223 The Commission’s proposal, if adopted, would allow state governors to reserve up to
15 percent of their federal block grant funds (including TANF, CDBG, HOME, Workforce
Investment Act funds, Social Services Block Grants, Child Care Block Grants, and transportation
funding) to support comprehensive redevelopment projects sponsored by local governments.”224
Localities that agree to undertake these comprehensive projects would apply to states for funding
through HUD program dollars already administered at the state level and a consolidated program
review process and distribution of funds would occur following the application process.225 While
the Commission’s proposal is sound, it must go one step further by not only offering state and
local governments the opportunity to produce mixed-income, regionally friendly developments
with supportive services, but also by encouraging and providing benefits to local levels for
partaking in these projects.
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The federal government must set up a system in which the allocation of funds is based on
fostering and encouraging local leadership and a corresponding unified and coordinated strategy
in line with the federal vision. The chart below outlines the federal funding programs, their
current application requirements and the necessary alterations in funding criteria that need to be
made to achieve state and local public sector leadership in the implementation of the federal
vision in diverse urban centers across the country.226

Table B: Additional Funding Stream Criteria Required for Centralized Partnership Model
Funding Streams
CDBG/HOME

Current Funding Stream
Requirements227
A Consolidated Plan that: outlines
the local affordable housing need
and provides a housing and market
study.

Public Housing—Housing Choice
Voucher Program & Hope VI

A 5 year annual PHA plan that:
outlines housing needs; housing
choice voucher capacity; community
service and self-sufficiency
initiatives; rent determination; and
operations and management policies
in PHA properties.

LIHTC

A Qualified Application Plan that:
outlines projects that serve the
lowest income families and are
structured to remain affordable for
the longest period of time.

Additional Criteria Necessary for
Centralized Partnership Model
A Consolidated Plan that requires:
proof of public sector coordination
through a strategy under the mayor;
effective leveraging of both nonprofit and for-profit entities through
detailed project descriptions;
projects and policies that
individualize and promote mixedincome housing through zoning
ordinances and pro-affordable
housing land-use policies, strategic
community development and
regional and smart growth through
regional fair-share housing
allocation plans.
A 5 year annual PHA plan that
requires: a coordinated role of the
PHA under the mayor’s strategy as
indicated by being mentioned in
detail in the Consolidated Plan;
detailed plans for projects with a
combination of mixed-income
housing, strategic community
development and regional and smart
growth.
A Qualified Application Plan that:
outlines specific projects in line with
the federal vision, and shows how
the potential projects fit in with the
local coordinated strategy discussed
in the Consolidated Plan.
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NSP

A NSP Grant Submission Template
& Checklist that: requires funds to
be distributed to areas with the
greatest need, including those with
the greatest percentage of home
foreclosures, and also requires a
description of each project to be
undertaken using NSP funds.

A NSP Grant Submission Template
& Checklist that: describes projects
where funding will go towards
mixed-income housing with strategic
community development services
and a regional and smart growth
elements, and has a focus that is
aligned with the local and state
government leadership.
Additionally, the plan must show
how the projects geographically
complement other projects outlined
in the Consolidated Plan and the
Qualified Application Plan.

By requiring some of the criteria on the different funding applications as well as allowing some
of the criteria to be optional, but with the added benefit of receiving additional or streamlined
funds if completed, the federal government can inspire state and local leadership and effective
and unified local and private sector implementation. The adoption of these new criteria enables
the interaction between the varying levels of the public sector and the private sector to revolve
around achieving a specific vision as opposed to simply allocating funds.
The federal government almost must demand the accountability of state and local
affordable housing players. While the federal government currently requires PHAs and the
owners of properties with permanent rent subsidies to collect and submit information on an
annual basis about resident incomes and rent contributions, LIHTC, CDBG and HOME do not
require property owners to regularly submit data on the incomes and rent burdens of residents.228
As a result, less is known about these programs’ long-term impact on housing affordability due
to the fact that it is impossible to track who is served, mobility patterns and changing prices.229
According to John Kromer, “not enough studies look at the effectiveness of affordable housing
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programs and resident patterns in affordable housing units.”230 He also mentioned that such
studies are necessary and critical to the successful revision of current low-income housing
programs.231 Public sector leadership, from federal to state to local levels, must require
performance measures and must base the distribution of funds and the formation of programs on
the results of these metrics. Public sector leaders also need to critically review and assess the
capacity of the organizations that are implementing affordable housing programs. Such leaders
need to ask whether the organizations have sufficient resources, capable staff members,
necessary experience and incentives designed to promote effective administrative
performance.232
There are multiple strategies the public sector can use to hold itself and the organizations
involved in the affordable housing process accountable. Performance data should be collected
and published regularly.233 Communities can also enter into performance-based contracts with
public agencies, for-profit companies and non-profit organizations, in which payments and funds
are tied to performance targets.234 All affordable housing strategies at the local leadership level
should be required to set a formal performance measurement plan in which goals are set out, and
quantitative short-term output indicators and long-term outcome indicators of success are
defined. The chart below, taken from Bruce Katz’s article “Rethinking Local Affordable
Housing Strategies,” is an example of a performance measurement plan for a regional fair-share
allocation policy.
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Table C: Regional Fair-Share Housing Allocation Performance Measurement Plan
Affordable Housing Goals

Outputs (1-5 years)

Outcomes (5-20 years)

Promote Balanced Regional
Growth

Share of affordable housing in
suburban jurisdictions

Geographic concentration of
affordable housing

Amount of residential
investments in older urban
neighborhoods

Average commute times (for
each jurisdiction)
Ratio of jobs to housing (for
each jurisdiction)

Katz et al., “Rethinking Local Affordable Housing,” 104.

The federal government should take the success of the local performance measurement plans into
account when reallocating funds for the following cycle.
State Government Role
State governments have three main functions in the centralized partnership model in
relation to the financial and regulatory aspects of the incentive structure: to drive a competitive
LIHTC allocation process based on individual project alignment with local coordinated
strategies, to introduce pro-affordable housing mandatory zoning and land-use ordinances, and to
work with their jurisdictions to come up with regional fair-share allocation plans. Additionally,
for smaller urban areas that receive CDBG and HOME funds through states, allocation should be
based on local leadership, coordinated strategies and detailed plans to effectively leverage
private sector partners on specific projects.
States can alter zoning laws by creating ordinances that apply to localities within its
jurisdiction that allow for garage apartments and different types of secondary units, so as to
permit higher-density development and encourage a mix of housing densities in new housing
projects through cluster-zoning or Planned Unit Development.235 In relation to the effective
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execution of the regional housing and smart growth goal, state leaders should require local
jurisdiction political figures to participate in the regional fair-share allocation planning process
so as to enhance the probability that local needs will be met and that regional goals will be
created as a benchmark for all leaders. Such a collaborative process will enable state and local
governments to implement policies that are tailored to local populations and also serve larger
growth goals. The regional fair-share allocation process should also demand more accountability
from all of the local public sector players and state policymakers, as these government levels are
not only accountable for their local populations, but to each other. Through federal incentives,
states should be motivated to both work with and provide additional incentives to local
governments to conduct a unified affordable housing policy based on the components of the
federal vision.
Local Government Role
While federal and state governments provide important incentives to inspire local
leadership, local public sector action and planning based on such incentives is critical in terms of
effective implementation and long-term impact. In relation to mixed-income housing, local
governments have to leverage for-profit and non-profit participation in the creation of successful
mixed-income developments. According to an article entitled “Rethinking Local Affordable
Housing Strategies: Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and Practice” by Bruce Katz, “states
delegate authority to regulate the private housing market to local governments, which then
establish and enforce zoning policies, land use restrictions, development fees, subdivision and
design requirements, building codes, rent controls, and other regulations that reflect local
priorities and objectives.”236 Other tools that local governments can use to encourage mixedincome development include waivers or deferral of impact fees, fast-track permitting, lower
236
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parking requirements, and the loosening of design standards such as street widths and
setbacks.237 Local governments need to create and continually amend inclusionary zoning
practices and other land-use policies to reflect changing development patterns. For example, as
land available for development decreases, inclusionary zoning requirements can be changed to
apply to the rehabilitation of units and smaller developments.
The role of local government leaders in realizing the strategic community development
goal is to set a strategy that spans across all public sector agencies, requires collaboration
between these organizations, and engages for-profit and non-profit groups in the execution of
affordable developments that include supportive services. The mayor should involve for-profit
and non-profit partners and government agency counterparts in devising an effective strategy that
outlines resident needs by geographic area and economic viability issues. Such unified strategy
should also assign a public agency to the task of tracking success metrics and applying the results
to delivery improvements. In relation to regional planning, local governments must receive
additional funding based on their willingness to work with their state government to produce a
regional fair-share allocation plan in which regional and smart growth goals are outlined and
strategic community development and mixed-income housing are taken into account.
Private Sector Role
For-profit and non-profit entities need to be strategically utilized by local governments.
Private sector organizations should be placed on projects that address all three goals within the
large public sector affordable housing vision. For example, the RFP process to private sector
players should include specific proposals for mixed-income and smart growth developments that
provide supportive services to residents. In this scenario, for-profit leaders must be brought to the
table to identify the economics of building a development near public transportation and non237

Katz et al, “Rethinking Local Affordable Housing,” 69.
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profit organizations should be used to identify resident needs and concerns as well as the
supportive services necessary to enable them to live peacefully and successfully in a new
development. In relation to strategic community development, local governments will need to
broker a process in which CDCs and social service practitioners are paired with for-profit
developers or the local housing authority to highlight resident needs and develop the logistics of
social service delivery to residents. For the execution of mixed-income housing production, forprofits, based on their strengths of intellectual capital and technical skills, should be involved
with projects that require building affordable units in higher income developments. Non-profits
must be leveraged to redevelop low-income areas into mixed-income neighborhoods and to
purchase units developed by for-profit developers to sell to the lowest-income populations. If
effective local leadership exists, private sector entities should have specific outlined roles in the
affordable housing process that complement their strengths and how they can best contribute to
low-income housing production.
Conclusion
The below chart outlines the structure of the new centralized partnership model.

Table D: Centralized Partnership Model Structure
Goal

Sector
Affiliation

Integration

All sectors

Direct
Recipients of
Goal and
Funding/
Services
Related to Goal
State and local
levels, public
and private
sectors

Functions

Leadership

Funding/
Incentives

Mixed-income
housing
development

Federal, state
and local
public sector
leaders

Regulatory and
programmatic and taxbased incentives built in
to existing HUD
programs/funding
streams (specifically
CDBG, HOME, Hope
VI, & public housing,
LIHTC & NSP)

78

Strategic
Community
Development/
Supportive
Services

All sectors

State and local
levels, public
and private
sectors

Smart Growth
& Regional
Housing

All sectors

State and local
levels, public
and private
sectors

Promote resident
self-sufficiency
through
supportive
services such as
housing
counseling and
job training
Reduce traffic
congestion and
socio-economic
polarization
through building
affordable
housing near
transportation,
good schools,
etc…and
revitalizing
urban lowincome areas to
appeal to
broader socioeconomic levels
and be more
pedestrian
friendly

Federal, state
and local
public sector
leaders

Programmatic and taxbased incentives built
into existing HUD
programs/funding
streams

Federal, state
and local
public sector
leaders

Programmatic and taxbased incentives built
into existing HUD
programs/funding
streams

Unlike the process represented in the decentralized partnership model table, the
centralized model is likely to be more holistic due to the fact that affordable housing policy is
permeated by and grounded in a three-pronged vision set by the federal government, as opposed
to a combination of distinct funding streams not tied to unified goals. All sectors are involved
with each goal in the vision. Furthermore, under the proposed model, each goal spans across the
entire policy field of federal, state and local public and private sector actors. While the federal
funding programs that currently drive the affordable housing process are still relevant and
equally important, their execution and effectiveness are now based on the pursuit of overarching
goals. The funding programs no longer just allow for affordable housing production, preservation
and rehabilitation, but they help form the backbone of national low-income housing
advancement. So the centralized partnership model, in essence, modifies the current
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decentralized process by connecting the players and programs through basing the policy arena
and its actors on coordinated standards and tangible goals.

Thesis Conclusion
This thesis, “Affordable Housing & Cross-Sector Partnerships: Improving the Bottom
Line,” set out to explore the nature of cross-sector partnerships in the low-income housing
process. Through an in-depth study of each sector’s strengths and weaknesses the conclusion was
drawn that every sector has indispensable strengths necessary for shaping and implementing the
comprehensive and diverse facets that define the policies behind and the actors implementing
affordable housing. However, the thesis also argued, based on an analysis of Philadelphia, that
the current decentralized cross-sector model is inefficient in terms of maximizing the corecompetencies of all the players involved and the efficient use of funding sources. It was
recommended that a shift to a centralized system driven by public sector leadership, coordination
and a specific vision including the goals of mixed-income and integrated housing, strategic
community development and smart growth and regional housing, would greatly benefit the
process. Federal regulatory, programmatic and tax-based incentives within the existing funding
programs were explored as a viable tool to drive the centralized model in terms of encouraging
local leadership, public and private sector collaboration and unification and adherence to federal
big-picture affordable housing goals. The below diagrams illustrate the difference between the
decentralized and centralized models.
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Decentralized Cross-Sector Partnership Model

Federal Funding
Programs

State Allocation of
Federal Funds

Local RFP Process
to allocate federal
and state funds

Uncoordinated Private
Sector Implementation of
Federal Funds

Centralized Cross-Sector Partnership Model

Federal
Vision &
Incentives

Federal
Funding
Programs

State allocation of
funds and leadership
consistent with the
federal vision and
incentives given to
local governments

Local RFP process
leadership through
a unified strategy
under mayor’s
office consistent
with the federal
vision

Directed
public/private sector
(non-profit and forprofit) collaboration
for iplementation of
localized federal
vision

The bolded boxes under the centralized partnership model diagram represent the two
most important players—the federal and local governments— in the affordable housing arena.
While the federal government is imperative due to its role as the vision setter with great financial
capacity and its ability to motivate the other players in the field with various types of incentives,
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the local public sector is equally important because it is the actor that turns an overarching vision
into a locally relevant action plan that is implemented through a specific private sector base. It is
only through coordinated local leadership and innovation, as depicted through the Boston
example, that the need for affordable housing, a place-based social ill, can be tackled head on
through effective solutions tailored to local needs. Not unless both federal goals and local public
sector leadership are present can the centralized model be successful. The effectiveness of these
two players can bring about a more truly collaborative and meaningful process resulting in
improvement to the delivery and impact of affordable housing.
A factor impacting this thesis that manifested itself halfway through the research process
is the effect of the current financial crisis on affordable housing production. The low-income
housing system is largely run on tax credits heavily bought by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
whose roles and capacities have completely changed over the past several months. Furthermore,
the crisis has also caused a dramatic reduction of the private sector capital for, and pricing of,
such tax credits. Simply put, the current economic and financial crisis is severely and negatively
impacting the flow of capital needed for affordable housing production.
While the assumption was made in the introduction of the thesis that credit markets will
ultimately reemerge, how the affordable housing players act going forward in dealing with this
crisis is a significant question. In fact, such crisis further brings out and emphasizes a critical
finding of this thesis…the need for a federal vision and public and private sector collaboration to
realize such vision. In this transformative period, the application of player core-competencies
and the efficient use of funds are necessary in order to maximize the amount of innovative, costeffective and long-term solutions and policies that are created and implemented. Michael
Stegman, the Director of Policy at the MacArthur Foundation’s Program on Human and
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Community Development, who has been a consultant to the Fannie Mae Foundation and an
important policymarker at HUD, mentioned that it is imperative for innovative models at the
state and local levels to emerge in response to the financial crisis.238 Based on the findings of this
thesis and the fact that all affordable housing players are currently looking to the federal
government for guidance and assistance, the urgent recommendation can be made that Barack
Obama, Shaun Donovan and other federal leadership forces including Congress need to give
local leaders the necessary vision, tools and incentives to create coordinated and unified lowincome housing strategies that use private sector talents and resources to their fullest.

238

Michael Stegman 2/20/2009.
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Appendix: Interview Notes & Sample Interview Questions
Sample Interview Questions
1. What role does and should each of the following play in the affordable housing process:
the private sector, the government sector, cross-sector partnerships and the non-profit
sector?
2. Which of the above groups should lead the affordable housing process and why?
3. What kinds of partnerships between non-profit community development organizations,
private sector actors, and local and national government agencies are most effective in
generating successful low-income affordable housing policy in urban areas with
significant low-income populations?
4. What is the best delivery model for affordable housing?
5. What are the core-competencies of non-profit intermediaries such as LISC and Enterprise
Community Partners? What do they add most to the affordable housing picture?
6. What is the most effective way for local and state governments and the national
government to work together and efficiently drive the affordable housing process?
7. Are there city or state programs that best deliver affordable housing? If so, what are the
common elements of success that these city/state programs have?
8. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current affordable housing process
(including programs such as LITC, CDBG, Vouchers, and the new National Housing
Trust, etc…)?
9. How has your perspective on the role of the varying “players” and processes in affordable
housing changed over the last 20 years?

Interview Notes:
Altman, Andy 1/22/2009
•
•
•
•

•

City: policy/planning, regulator, funder (financial)
1) Policy: what is the policy, overall affordable housing
2) Regulator: Land use
3) Funding:
o Federal Flow
o CDBG: formula, programmatic asides
o Housing Trust Fund, part of property tax, 10-14million, completely flexible, a lot
of money given to non-profits
o LITC, apply from state (Philly recommends to state)
Most housing you have leverage multiple sources
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Land—own, 30,000 parcels of land
Affordable housing: utilizing these resources
Stabilization of housing stock, Philly less affected by economy
Neighborhood Stabilization Program, 2 million homes for full acquisition
Public housing—PHA, largest property owner
Sect. 108 vouchers
Vehicles: CDCs, PHA—Hope VI, are they replacing all the units?
CDBG: consolidated plan—lays out Philly’s plan
o Also look at Philly’s application for Neighborhood Stabilization Program
o Could put out RFP, Philly Housing Development Corporation
• Partnerships: put out RFP, whoever gets it based on project viability
o Question is who can deliver a profit
o Non-profits don’t always have same capacity as private sector
• Pre-development, city uses land as contribution
• Deals always in-flux, challenge is when to pull plug
• Reporting guidelines
• It’s hard to have one money pot
• ***POLITICS: have funds been going to viable? Need to make process competitive,
have in past given money to same groups
o Land disposition process messed up
o Barriers to private process, politics, takes a while to get land
o Intersection of funding and bureaucratic process, partly because so many
requirements exist and more money spent on administrative tasks then affordable
housing
• Also have to think about neighborhood revitalization, did an RFP, put in criteria to look
at how the project is part of a larger revitalization effort
o **City has control, where do we focus the housing process?
What programs are most effective?
• Tax Credit Program: Can calculate into pro-forma, non-profits can access it, is a more
efficient vehicle and less politicized
• Block grant program also good
• Tax Abatement Program: very successful, always at the margin bc/value not high in
Philly, ex: the Cira center was built off of subsidies
• Affordable housing will continue, federal stimulus money could increase affordable
housing efforts bc/is essentially a gov. created market
• Now we have foreclosure issue, bc/will destabilize area and drive down property values
• Issue w/credits, so city has bigger subsidy—fewer units, and city has to spend money that
could have been used for affordable housing on foreclosures
• CDBG and Trust Fund—re-allocate to homeless issue in city, tighter strain on $
• Cities can’t produce affordable housing fully, no revenues to make up loss, need other
force such as federal gov.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Bear, Matthew H. & Stephanie Wall 12/11/2008
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

1) Funding comes from everywhere
Federal funds given to CDC’s through the city
OHCD—distributes money, city gets 75%???
Housing Trust Fund—Title Transfers
Proposals—complex
OSH—apply to them, another round to HUD, nice to just go to city
2) PA Housing Finance—entity tax credits, most complicated, need consultants
Federal Home Loan Bank, max 650, complicated
PHFA: denied from the most, economy important factor, tax credits end up not being
worth that much
3) Private Funding, banks, home depot
LISC, Enterprise Center—national intermediaries
Selection: units tied to housing, does community support housing? Community v. city
4) DCED, state level
Get funds from federal government
Application in one spot
Federal, state and city governments, same agenda—good?
Submitted on file
Green: LEED consultant, RDA, Division 15 and 16, water conservation, silver rated
Have limitations
Takes so long to get funding sources, then cost changes
***Tension: central v. flexibility w/local
Low-Income Housing tax credits, gov. losing 30 cents for every dollar
Private:
o Cloisters so big
o Pennrose
o Building quality the same,
Cloisters 3, PEC built
o Private, property management
o Not huge role for private sector, investing $ to help them
Process starts when: someone notices vacant land, see, think, find out who owns,
acquisition (city ownership)
Where do you get your money first?
Takes a couple years to get money, plans, submit to RDA, bid out to architects, envision
phase 1 and 2
So 1) get money 2) bid
Quality v. getting things done (Fattah)
Ex: compromised on expensive brick, changing windows
Problems with carpet, looking at alternatives
Matt’s ob as an architect is to cut costs
Matt: is RDA and Consultant
Every 2 weeks job site visit
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Different departments on different things
More collaboration between social service division and CDC
o Bridge community gap
Social services: who will live there…after built key handed to social services
Case manager: cloisters 3, open to community, does walk through, doesn’t deal with
clients directly
Penn architect school and HUD Comm/Univ. partnership (Richard Wessling)
Penn, improve park
LISC West—collaboration between CDC’s in Philly, collab. Enterprise CDC, Project
HOME
University City District
***most efficient thing would be to have gov. solely do affordable housing process
CDC—get it started, don’t revitalize private development
CDC’s: accountability, gov. can never low on ground
Innovation: digital inclusion, private sector—taking some private sector ideas
Partner with banks
Policy goals
Impact: clients, neighborhood (real-estate values, neighborhood surveys)

Egan, Conrad 2/27/2009
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

More activity at state and local level in comparison with federal level
Need stronger affordable housing network
Very little difference between for-profits and non-profits—both make fees, make profit,
money goes to vision and investors
Nonprofits not consistent, DC, Boston and San-Francisco have strong nonprofit networks
HPN is good indicator of spottiness
Need state and local awakening of importance of housing
SHAF organization, Bill Kelley, headquartered in Washington
More confusing, complex landscape then was when complete federal control of
affordable housing
In glory days of sec. 8 program in 70s, almost always for profit developers could easily
nail down site, not complex local approval program, got AHAP, then HUD, says you
complete steps and we will give you site, get 224 D4 insurance, take to local S + L and
get financing based on FHA assurance
Call NHP inc., get NHP to syndicate tax benefits, pre-1986
NHP would sell tax through broker like Merrill, thirst for tax benefits at individual level
Now you have “lasagna deals”, LIHTC, tax funds, have 2 kinds of debt
More expensive to produce, but more eyes on the deal, more people with skin on the
game
Tax credits—program investors at risk
Bank appetite decrease
1 ingredient for success-political leadership! Mayors, county heads, etc…
Not much leadership on federal level, Mayor Menino, Daily, Fenty, Jerry Connolly
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Someone to demonstrate that support for housing is high priority, hard to train people in
this
Housingpolicy.org, wiki of affordable
Housing can see result of willingness to exert political capital
Function of white house needs consistent support from office of urban policy
IRS, also department of transportation—transit oriented development important,
T4America
Beltway burden, heavy load concept, need strong congressional support, need a Barney
Frank/Chris Dodd
Federal government needs to play new role, identify ingredients for success, provide
incentives for land use, goes to transportation area
Need to make production more accessible
Need outside influences, Neighborworks great example, important player
Macarthur and Clinton Foundations, major initiatives to provide funding
Need to support training of state and local jurisdictions
HPN—help groups work together, people to sit on boards
5 million in stimulus, preservation, lowest-income, need to preserve currently assisted
affordable properties, make de facto developments
Fairfax County—purchase property to reserve de fact developments
Need to produce aff. Housing, find places, need to develop compact developments to
rezone and connect to transit
Lincoln Land—article, rezoning approach
Preserve concept of mixed-income housing, includes lowest-income, biggest challenge,
need to increase sex.8 deep subsidy system

Guard, Gloria 12/2/2008
(E-mail correspondance)
-I got a chance to review your questions today and I think they are very comprehensive, they
cover many areas in the affordable housing world. I am not sure if your answers will cover the
barriers to development or some of the other trends which you may have read about in the
Harvard publication etc. They seem to be aimed mostly at specific developments here at PEC.
-The best next step for you would be to visit PEC specifically the CDC and take a tour of the
cdc developments. I have copied Kira Strong and Noemi Diaz so that they can help schedule
this. You do not need me to take you on the tour, perhaps Matt or Stephanie or Monica could
tour you around. It will depend on people’s time. We have tons of hard facts and figures about
sources of funding for each development and, in all cases, we were the “driver” in the
developments. Hopefully as you tour around and ask questions, you will be able to narrow the
scope of your paper and develop a thesis for use in these very tumultuous times. As you know,
the banking industry and the housing industry are inexorably tied to each other, so the housing
industry is now facing a pretty enormous crisis of confidence, and any research on how to get
these housing units built for the future would be very helpful.
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Kaplan, Ron 1/18/2009
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

DC affordable housing policy—solicit developers, when gov issues RFP, must follow DC
housing requirements
20% units have to be affordable
How do you define affordability? 10% at 80% of AMI (average median income)
o AMI in Bethesda is higher than AMI in lower income area, for ex: 80% would be
64,000, you can still pay rent—may not affect development
o Other 50% at 60% AMI—low-median income, start to have to reduce rents
o Anacostia Waterfront Organization—semi-public and private, people saw an
opportunity to set new standards, wanted even stronger affordable housing
o 30% set aside for affordable housing, 15% of overall had to be at 30% of AMI,
15% at 60% of AMI, so talking about poor people and lower rents, **people that
vote don’t understand, great goal but no one can do it
Bids assumed what private developers had to do
1) set policy 2)project—waterfront, solicit proposals, how much will you pay
government, developers lose a ton of money on building, the additional cost is 60 million
No one on city council had any concept of this, ultimately affordable housing is still a
real-estate deal
**POLICY QUESTIONS Land at waterfront valuable, do you want people of lesser
means to live everywhere? Or instead of providing 60 million cost to city, we’ll give you
more units (200) but well do it a mile away, it costs less but its more affordable housing
What AMI levels do you require? Does the affordable housing have to be on-site?
1 mile away more efficient
Need integrated units
Developers saying we have an obligation to build affordable housing, but why does it
have to be on site
Very political process, city council guy made it sound one way
Ron was looking to invest in waterfront, but new AMI requirements killed any deals
Now its tricky bc/you cant say affordable housing has to be reduced but returns aren’t
attractive to developers, have to say found another way to create more affordable housing
Why would developer do this when gov. policy adds so many costs
Andy: you don’t turn over to developers to do what they want, you insist policy goals, ex:
affordable housing, open space
Ex: should poor people have views of central park? Capitalist society, rich people need a
view, BUT when Montgomery County becomes so expensive, perceived as a problem
When 50 new homes built, gov. has control, should they require some to be sold at
700,000 (he thinks not)
As long as rules consistent, it means that farm would only have value of x, when you
suddenly change pricing, its bad

Kromer, John 1/30/2009
•

City redevelopment authority—state charter
o Issues bonds, eminent domain
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o State charter, gov. board
o Sometimes have entities merged
• Sometimes housing authority and redevelopment authority part of the city gov.
o PHA—is Philly’s leading developer
o 2 authorities, don’t need city housing department
o OHCD, whose in charge, what’s the relationship?
• OHCD: employees work for mayor, not civil servants
o Weakness: no bond power, has to go to city’s law director and comptroller, cant
turn around property transactions overnight
1. Levels gov…strengths and weaknesses? Should process be streamlined?
• Fed level problem: CDBG, HOME managed through one division of HUD, and public
housing is totally different process with different funding…need to combine 2, give cities
more flexibility
• need more accountability, PHA is free agent—serious problem
• State level: provides some money, small amount, more flexible, used for home
preservation—is a good thing
• PHFA—gives development funding, well administered, has 2 good programs to help with
foreclosures
• LITC—funding awarded in competition
• Local: number of agencies not big problem if the issue of who is in charge is addressed
• City, through OHCD, has contracts with non-profit’s, want to outsource
• Everyone needs to support mayor!
• Rendell (when he ran OHCD), tension between redevelopment authority and OHCD,
OHCD would do policy, plan and budget and the authority would be implementer, issue
over who would get money
• Final decision up to RDA
• Terry Gillin—prima person now to talk to in housing
• ***Call for consolidation misdirected, real issue is leadership and process
• Fed. Level—HUD secretary fine
• ***Cities have to get organized at local levels, need everyone rallying under mayor
o Philly took good step in having Nutter appoint himself as head of PHA
2. Partnerships
• Annual RFP
• Consideration given to non-profits and neighborhoods with strategies
• Some groups have money and connections and thus get projects
o Need to be more fair, and provide access to everyone to build housing
• Need clear criteria
• Vacant homes—you get subsidy, rehab, sales price goes back to pay loan, good program,
**this is key way to attract new developers
• Head of program would do proposals with developers, this is new and not like
government system normally
o this program is way to let ambitious developers in
• for top non-profit development groups gov. will them develop plans and get land for
future development
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APN (association of Puerto-rican??)—gov. helped them, now have over 130 units and did
new town homes and green space, in area in north philly near central campus of Temple
3. Outcomes measurement, tracking residents
• Not enough studies that look at affordable housing projects
o 2001 study—good results, most places were occupied so money not wasted
• Turnover—mostly you see same people are there, where did people come from that
moved there? A lot of times from nearby blocks where people were happy
• *Nobody looks carefully enough at resident patterns and effectiveness of housing
• ***this would be very helpful in terms of refining and revising housing programs
4. Non-profit v. private sector attributes
• Tension between private and non-profit sectors
• For-profits work with community groups like churches, so can also be in synch with
community needs
• Public housing funds, until 1990’s were inflexible
• New MOVING to WORK program to make subsidies and funds more flexible
• Giving cities flexibility is key, but HUD obviously has to require plans to ensure
accountability
5. Economy
• Rental housing—will be increased demand for rental housing bc/of economy and
foreclosures, public funds should be more flexible
o Most cost-effective policy would be to do rent subsidies, section 8 program, city
should just reward public housing subsidies, need more flexibility, would be cost
effective
• ***link housing subsidies with workforce development programs, job readiness
programs—if one had a rental subsidy linked to a job, you could monitor newly placed
employee
•

Mandujano, Gabriel 1/22/2009
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Land, financing, demographics, could be public
Loans, Community Reinvestment Act (LISC, Enterprise)—private sector influenced by
the public sector
PIDC—private sector issuing gov. money
Grant from foundation
Assemble what’s available of resources
Demand: private, market
Project management, PHA, private sector
Private sector could be many things
Structuring of projects vary
Responsibilities for projects not the same
Time can pass—inefficiency
PHA—cookie cutter model
**can’t have one model for affordable housing bc/each case so different
Operating and capital financing, don’t take upside risks
Non-profits need to get funding from diverse avenues
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•
•

•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Small non-profits have timing issue—getting financing to carry out a project is hard
The Walnut Hill plan mentions that one of its goals is to encourage long-term
affordability. How will the CDC go about promoting and implementing this goal when
subsidies expire?
LITC expire after 15 years
KEY QUESTION: How do you keep housing affordable?
• Control land, own property
• Community land trusts with a community board, own grounds, like
homeownership but money goes back to community
• Co-op housing, own share of company that owns it, real property, put in covenant
saying no increase in resale values
Don’t trust community boards and CDCs
***Over long term: CDCs become increasingly professionalized
Co-op housing is the best strategy bc/of non-changeable covenants and you are
decentralizing control over land
Challenges to co-op housing:
• Developer side—transfers control from themselves to the co-op structure
• Need to create awareness on part of consumer and developer
• Banks understand this, more liquid system
• Challenge 2: laziness, easier to build LITC deal than co-op, also have to organize
membership of co-op, educate banks, creative financing
• ***need to place more emphasis on social capital
UCD, PEC, are in partnership with them but they all have different approaches
At some level competition is a good thing!
CDCs that want to build need to have a big enough area
Inefficiencies: CDCs should be able to acquire and hold land, CDCs need to hire good
staff
Not a lot of economies of scale, gain from learning from one another
Also need people close to communities to understand needs
The goals of the affordable housing producer vary, sometimes there can be a focus on
neighborhood revitalization as well, sometimes there can be a focus on just affordable
housing and producing units
Worked w/consultant, developed surveys
Logic model approach, choose big impact goal
Resident leadership, preserve social and economic diversity of neighborhood, etc…goals
of CDC
From outputs you choose your methods, where evaluation comes in
Ex: build leadership through training, then you assess whether the method was the right
tool and then you can re-evaluate
Hard to get renters involved, reaching out mainly to those who have tenure in area, but
have to reach out to renters for time period they are there…means need to maintain
constant outreach to new and old renters, have to knock on their doors
Have a home repair program, want to do scatter-site homeownership, could buy to build
scale and then develop
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***HRP Program—Office of Housing and Community Development, pay your developer
fee and grant to rehab 115K + 35K to buy and renovate house and you get 15K fee
• Co-op housing, people need to believe CDCs has competence in housing, need balance
sheet and income statement (which they do not yet have)
• Now they are focusing on data from street team, developing grocery store in community
corridor
• Working on resident training, W. Philly high, get home repair programs
• Penn helps
• **private developers bring credibility and expertise, collateral
FINANCIAL CRISIS:
• Operating money from foundations
• City money—huge problem
• Everyone hopeful for federal government
• Center for culinary enterprises—will need federal money for completion
• Federal government will be bigger player on project level
• Financing:
o Harder to get money
o No more buyers
o Foreclosures hit Philly and Walnut Hill not as hard and interesting
opportunities come up because of it
o Neighborhood Stabilization Program: you as CDC not taking any risk
o Best-scatter site rehab program
•

Stegman, Michael 2/20/2009
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The government is in a tough position now
Key question: Am I assuming crisis will change system, or assuming credit markets will
resume?
CDCs will not make, we will lose small non-profits, there will be some level of
consolidation, doesn’t necessarily mean there is a smaller role for non-profits
o Scale and balance sheet, financial sophistication will become increasingly
important
o Will see survivors
National Housing Trust, Low Income Trust in San Francisco…will be self-helps of the
world to help design new models
CDFI’s will not make it (a lot of them)
Foundation Community cannot become capital providers of last resort
Macarthur “Window of Opportunity” program, invests in better and stronger non-profit’s
Can’t equate non-profits w/CDCs, owners Macarthur supports different, they are the
strongest and the best, capitalized, most vertically oriented
Small scale CDC model may well go extinct, grew generations of expertise, had scale for
20 years
LIHTC, systems became critical vehicle for CDs, it became efficient in delivery of
formal rental housing
Economics of small-scale organization’s bad, unclear what will happen to LIHTC
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•

2.25 million go to states will be interesting to fill in gap on projects—how that evolves is
unclear, stimulus in other areas suggests we are
Fannie, Freddie, and banks problems now, so don’t know what delivery system will be in
the future
Put money into housing trust fund (**), but supposed to capitalized by Fannie and
Freddie, so no new sources of capital
Using HOME delivery system doesn’t align with states
A) we aren’t sure what non-profit partners will look like
B) don’t know where deep subsidy will come from
Is their role for Neighborhood Stabilization on CDC side? Can they move themselves in
critical positions?
o A lot of money running through Philly, NEED NEIGHBORHOOD PRESENCE,
somebody has to connect family to assistance
o People that are behind don’t contact lenders, a problem so need outreach
Need to figure out who will play critical roles in mitigation, MAYBE CDCs
Inclusionary zoning: need vibrant market, none of that in crisis works, but is an important
arrow into the quiver, agrees wit policy normally
Has to be reliable source of subsidy, want to see private capital and responsible private
developers in market, but they wont be attracted unless subsidies
Most sophisticated nonprofit developers like for profits—NEED BOTH
Low Income Housing Coalition created the Housing Trust Fund, thought we had created
a production program of first two decades in conjunction with tax credit
o Trust fund’s flexibility was such that you could use it to overcome barriers, could
be used to buy buffer space
o Having a Trust Fund at the national level could provide flexible gap financing—
was important missing element
o Trust fund could be used to preserve affordable housing, reinvested Hope VI,
stronger direct participation from HUD in relation to preservation
o *****watch for innovative models at the state level
o HUD secretary spoke at NYU, laying out priorities, mainly foreclosure but talked
about rental…lays out policy for first 4 years
 has to address HOPE 6, has to be re-authorized, thinking about broadening
it to include bad legacy HUD housing (not public housing)
Not going to see new production program

Sussman, Monica 1/19/2009
•
•
•
•
•

Depression, county a mess, 1934 housing Act 1934, utilize private sector
Congress always utilize private
FHA: mortgage insurance for single family and multifamily, government ensured
mortgages by private sector, 90% financing backed by federal government
Also have public housing
Government owned housing, goal to move out and on but became concentration of
poor/minority population

94

•
•
•
•
•

•
•

•
•

•

•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Late 60’s: multifamily rental, HUD provided subsidies, reduced interest rates on
mortgages through government subsidies
Then Nixon moratorium, then Congress established 108 program
108: tied to project, tenant paid 30% of rent, gov. paid rest, built housing for poor people,
combined w/FHA insurance
20 year contracts of section 108 ended in 90’s, government had huge costs, issues that
residents couldn’t move, no sect. 108 funding since 88
86 reform tax—LITC, gov. provides credit on tax returns, state get allocation, the state
has people apply for credits, used as equity financing, affordability requirement for 30
years, brings I partner, sells to investors such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac
Public housing: pull up by bootstraps, located in bad areas, NIMBY Hope VI program
Late 90’s concluded that housing authority didn’t have to own housing, could be owned
by private
o Leased to part that brought in tax credits, half public housing
o Became subsidy, goal to create mixed income
Mixed income housing flawed—NIMBY
Local:
o Zoning (ex: Montgomery county), permitting, inclusionary zoning, but fact is that
local areas don’t have big bucks needed to sustain affordable housing, HUD 80%
AMI, tax credit 60% AMI
LITC: run by Treasury, IRS code, run by states, treasury decides how much to allocate to
states
o Banks participate in this bc/get CRA credit, otherwise PRIVATE SECTOR
DOESN’T CARE
Key question: how do you get to cost/rehab low income areas, who pays the differential?
CDBG—can be used for housing and non-housing
• 3 million of section 108, 3 million of public housing, DC/Bethesda renovated
from tax credit program
• Federal laws and discrimination laws—provide the basis of affordable housing
industry
• Every state has housing finance agency but noting compared to the federal
government
1) marginal insurance
2) marginal subsidies
3) subsidies
4) direct subsidies
5) LITC
6) LITC rental housing
Barney Frank, draft preservation legislation, projects coming to an end, need to provide
incentives
Law doesn’t like to see non-profits, very few non-profit owned housing, if housing value
raised, want to take money and apply to other non profit activities
Ex: South Florida, Biscayne Bay, land owned by teachers, sell land to someone else,
rebuild for people, BUT teachers wanted money for teacher stuff
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Ex: church developed housing, can’t discriminate but it still indirectly happened, then
people moved out of neighborhoods, and the land became bad and the church had no
interest in land anymore
• LITC: give preference to non-profits, requires owners be for profit at end of the day, non
profits can be managing partners
• Ownership entity is private, why do you give non profit a leg up when competing equally
with private sector?
• Barney Frank: right of first refusal in his legislation
• non-profits have missions but no better skills or access to capital, national nonprofits act just like for-profits, ma and pa non-profits don’t have resources, Patty
Fay?
• Government needs to get system going, stimulus bill, tax credit market upset because
market disappeared, technical tax changes to spur industry
• Refund of credit, 5 year credit program
• As a result of meltdown, cant get mortgage loan so people ran to FHA
• Syndication community got too narrow, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, B of A had 60%
of housing market
• People wanted Congress to make investments of credits to more diverse marketplace
• Maybe make shorter investment requirement
• Programs revolved around direct grant, loan or tax subsidy—variations on same theme
10. What’s the best delivery model for affordable housing?
• HUD programs shelf-life 5-7 years, then we are spending too much money
• Tax credit program—states have to come up with tax allocation program, point system
sustained for 20 years
• Parameters say rents set at AMI, residents pay 30%--narrow band as to who can live
there, can marry credit program with voucher
• At end of the day affordable housing about money
• Programs at HUD work nicely but are expensive
• HUD budget about 36 billion, 20 for Section 108, 15/16 billion to renew vouchers, 6 for
public housing, rest around 5 for CDBG…big picture THIS IS NICKELS
• Some states have own tax credit programs
• Disintermediation: 30’s and 40’s had S+L and had people making deposits
• System that we now have is national and international (GLOBAL ECONOMY), money
is now coming from wall street not from direct community, city/states CANT COMPETE
on this level
• City/states can really only using zoning/permitting and local real-estate taxes, incentives
to bring in small businesses
• Hope VI developments were partnerships, HUD control, non-profits and private sector,
LITC, bond debt
• TAKES A VILLAGE TO PRODUCE AFFORDABLE HOUSING
• Skills
o Government: can do the right thing, no discrimination
o Private: creative using gov. programs, development, management
o Non-profit: strength in services to people
• NEED TO TIE ALL THESE PIECES TOGETHER for a finished product
•
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Has to be a combination of the best of all skills
Non-profits have to make money, same constraints as private sector to some extent
Units created are not enough, need covering—not touching tip of iceburg
Go from lowest income to teachers/firemen, not making enough money to live in their
own communities they serve, a problem, ex: Aspen, most people live 30 minutes away
• Moderate income people don’t qualify for credits
• New provision, appropriations bill, allows movement of subsidy from one property to
another
• Development owned for seniors in St. Louis by non-profit, many people no longer living
there, Katrina people are there, can’t come up with money to fix it
• Move to newly rehabbed site has: senior building, family building, senior home (3 parts),
general partner the same but the projects are different
-section 108, reduced the number of units by move
-was able t consolidate use agreements into one use agreement that made sense
***HUD ORGANIZATION:
-HUD not organized, most recent HERA conference-make HUD programs work more closely
with/complement LITC programs
-all programs meant to serve same people, but there is a lot of overlap of HUD programs and
LITC
-lack of trust between government levels (state, federal, etc…), policy and mindset therefore
NEEDS TO BE CHANGED, everyone is afraid of inspector general
-but FEMA had horrible reaction in New Orleans, so maybe HUD not that bad
•
•
•
•
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